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After more than four decades under the totalitarian regime of the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic, the Velvet Revolution initiated democratisation in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 
a comparison of the two processes of transitional justice, this project analyses through a few case 
study method the respective transitional justice measures implemented in the two countries. The 
analysis is based on interviews and secondary empirical data in order to answer if transitional 
justice is important for democratisation. By investigating the transitional justice processes in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, the project concludes that transitional justice assists 
democratisations in situations where a regular regime shift has happened. In the case of 
continuity of the elite of the former regime, the diffusion of norms by the EU was more influential 
on democratisation. 
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1. Field of research 
It is an established claim within the field of transitional justice that constructing stable 
democracies in post-conflict societies is not successful without a process of transitional justice 
(UN 2004:3-4,8, Teitel 2002:54, Sharp 2013:149, Stan & Nedelsky 2013a:70). The argument is 
that transitional justice establishes confrontations of the society’s past and this “revisiting” 
promotes a progressive history, which makes the society able to move on and to develop a 
stable democracy (Teitel 2002:110, Mihr 2013:299). However, Spain is a democracy today 
even though they chose to “forgive and forget” the wrongdoings of Franco’s fascist 
dictatorship (Stand & Nedelsky 2013a:123).  
In the cases of democratisations of the three Central European countries Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary after the collapse of the communist totalitarian regimes in 1989, 
the demand by their people was democracy promoted by individual processes of transitional 
justice. The uniqueness of these transitions lies in the fact that these countries were former 
totalitarian regimes. In contrary to the rule by dictatorship, where a clear line between the 
ruler and the ruled is drawn, the totalitarian regimes in Central Europe did not feature such 
clear lines. This characteristic had consequences for their processes of transitional justice. As 
the repression was diffused throughout the societies, the question of responsibility of the 
communist regimes’ wrongdoings was more complex than in previous cases of transition 
(Teitel 2002:163). 
Prosecutions and trials were not the central element of the processes of transitional justice in 
these Central European countries. In fact, the Communist Parties comprised large parts of the 
societies, having memberships of an average of 10 % of the population in Eastern Europe. 
Adding the relatives of members of the Communist Party (spouses, children, parents) to the 
count, 30-40 % of the populations were either members or relatives (Gonzalez-Enriquez 
2001:219-220). Moreover, the repression during the final decades of communism was 
characterised as “soft” or “civilized”. The violence that took place at the consolidation of 
communism after World War II, where opponents were sent to labour camps, tortured and 
killed (Shepherd 2000:23-24), stopped in the end of the 1950s and the start of the 1960s, and 
the number of victims harassed and imprisoned by the secret service was reduced during the 
1980s. In addition, the revolutions in the Central European countries in 1989 happened 
peacefully, hence the term velvet revolutions. Thus, the character of the repression and the 
question of responsibility complicated prosecutions and trials in the defence of the rule of law 
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and made it difficult to promote the confrontations of the past in that way. Therefore, laws 
purging the state apparatus for supporters of the regime became the central element in the 
transitional justice to ensure democratic transition (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2001:219-220).  
Czechoslovakia was the first country of the three to confront the wrongdoings by the 
communists with the implementation of the law on lustration in 1991 (Welsh 1996:416). This 
legislative act was justified, from the point of view of the Constitutional Court of 
Czechoslovakia, by the establishment of democracy:  
“Every State, especially one which had been obliged to suffer the violation of 
basic rights and freedoms by the totalitarian power for more than forty years 
has the right to apply such legislative measures which aim to foil the risk of 
subversion on the return of, or possible relapse into the totalitarian regime in 
order to establish a democratic system” (quoted in: Teitel 2002:166-167). 
The law purged anyone with a past in the security service (StB) from positions in the 
government, army, parliament, courts, state-owned businesses, academia, and media (Teitel 
2002:164) by detecting the names of collaborators in archives of files produced by the StB 
(Gonzalez-Enriquez 2001:224,227). In this way, the Czechoslovak state apparatus was purged 
of former supporters of the regime to ensure democracy (Teitel 2002:164).   
After a peaceful split of Czechoslovakia, known as the velvet divorce, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia became two independent states. The Czech Republic continued the practice of the 
comprehensive lustration law giving the need for certificates stating no connection to the 
former regime for more than 420,000 persons (Kunicova & Nalepa 2006:9). Even though the 
amount of positions that were purged in Poland and Hungary was smaller than in the Czech 
Republic, these countries had also established lustration laws as an integrated part of their 
transitional justice (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2001:222). Moreover, looking on today’s map of 
Europe, these Central European countries are an integrated part of the European Union and 
stable democracies.  
However, the case of Slovakia stands out compared to the other three countries. The country 
has never implemented the law on lustration of Czechoslovakia after it gained its 
independence in 1993. In fact, the country did not follow up on the wrongdoings by its 
communist regime before the parliament passed the Law on National Memory in 2002. The 
law established the Nation’s Memory Institute as the organ responsible for collecting and 
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publishing information on collaborators with the former secret service. However, the law 
does not foresee the sanctioning of these collaborators and all Slovaks, no matter their 
background in the communist totalitarian regime, are free to run for elections and work in the 
state apparatus (Kunicova & Nalepa 2006:5). Hence, the law did not purge former supporters 
to ensure democratisation nor did the country confront the past wrongdoings.  
Nevertheless, Slovakia is today a stable democracy integrated in the EU and even member of 
the Euro-zone as the only country of the above-mentioned Central European countries. In 
comparison to the established claim within the field of transitional justice, that societies need 
transitional justice to democratise, I wonder how the case of Slovakia can be explained.  
As mentioned above, scholars in the existing research of transitional justice argues that there 
are a correlation between transitional justice and democracy nevertheless, the relationship is 
difficult to test. When the relationship has been tested, the results are often contradicting, 
which made Tomas, Ron & Paris (2010) conclude 
“Given the paucity and contradictory nature of the empirical findings to date, 
there appears to be an urgent need for more sustained, systematic, comparative 
analyses, and for greater attention to fact-based rather than faith-based claims” 
(quoted in Horne 2014:498).  
As described above, the Czech Republic had one of the most radical lustration laws and most 
comprehensive transitional justice processes among the post-communist societies. The 
country is a democracy today and thus verifies the claim of the theory of transitional justice. 
In contrast, Slovakia spent more than a decade in independence before the Law on National 
Memory was passed, however without any purging effects. This makes me wonder; in a 
comparison of the two countries, what role did the transitional justice play in the 
democratisation? The fact that both countries are on common ground as two stable 
democratic EU member states today leads me to ask:  
 
1.2. Research Question 
Is transitional justice important for democratisation? 
This research question will be answered with the help of the following two working 
questions: 
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1) Why does the role of transitional justice in the democratisation processes of the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia differ?  
2) What was the influence of the EU in the democratisation processes? 
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2. Methodology 
In the following chapter, I outline the methodology of this project. The first three subsections 
constitute the research design. The first one presents critical realism as the scientific 
theoretical approach, where I argue how the considerations within critical realism open up 
for the analysis of causal mechanisms. In the second section, I present the two cases; the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia and I follow up on the analysis of causal mechanisms by 
introducing the process-tracing explaining-outcome method. This method delivers the 
methodological tools in the analysis of causal mechanisms through the single case study. The 
last section of my research design is an outline of the comparative method ‘most different 
system design’. After the presentation of the research design, I have a section presenting the 
considerations behind the choice of the empirical data consisting of interviews and secondary 
empirical data.   
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2.1. Critical Realism  
The reason for having a section elaborating on the scientific theoretical consideration lies in 
the acknowledgement that scientific theoretical interpretations influence all scientific work, 
whether these interpretations are recognised or not (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen:11). Therefore, 
the aim of this section is to present these interpretations and to discuss the influence they 
have on the present project.  
As the name alludes to, critical realism was developed as a critique of realism. Roy Bhaskar 
(1975, 1979) developed the theory in the 1970s from natural science (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 
2008:7). Results from this scientific field had until then identified unknown structures of the 
analysed “reality”. These results were Bhaskar’s proof, that behind the recognised “reality” 
there is an “underworld” of transcendent phenomena (Jespersen 2004:146-147) existing 
independent of our knowledge about them. To clarify, “there is no reason to believe that the 
shift from a flat earth theory to a round earth theory was accompanied by a change in the 
shape of the earth itself” (Sayer 2000:11). In the social sciences, this acknowledgement means 
that a valid research is an analysis of an intransitive, relatively persistent field of research. 
One could then ask, what would be relatively persistent in the social sciences, where the focus 
is often on non-persistent things as individuals or groups. However, relations between 
individuals, groups, and the relations between these relations are relatively persistent. In 
relation to this, social structures are understood as systemised relations (Buch-Hansen & 
Nielsen 2008:37-38). Furthermore, critical realism in social sciences operates within an open 
system. In other words, mechanisms and structures are constantly changing and being 
influenced by other mechanisms, in contrary to natural science where it is possible to isolate a 
mechanism from other mechanisms in a laboratory and to see exactly the thereby produced 
effects. In social sciences, this is not possible and therefore never possible to find all 
mechanisms causing and influencing the happening of one phenomenon (Buch-Hansen 
2008:26-27). 
The intransitive dimension, the ontology, includes three domains: the empirical, the actual, 
and the real domain. The empirical domain consists of experience and observation; the actual 
domain of phenomena and events. In both domains, everything is observable. The real 
domain, on the other hand, consists of non-observable structures and mechanisms, which 
cause and promote the events, phenomena etc., that are observable in the empirical and actual 
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domain (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2008:23-28). Thus, the belief is that “nothing comes from 
nothing” (Kurki 2007:365).  
The aim of science is therefore to analyse these structures and mechanisms in the intransitive 
dimension; the “underworld”, through the knowledge already established, as theories, models, 
descriptions, data, etc., in the transitive dimension; the “reality” (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 
2008:22). Hence, critical realism allows an analysis of the non-observable, the causal 
mechanisms, which in this project is the importance of transitional justice in the 
democratisation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This is done through the analysis of 
observations, phenomena and events. In the two cases, this could be the observation of 
opinion polls about the communist past, public statements of political leaders concerning the 
communist past and the phenomena of e.g. EU enlargement and transitional justice measures.  
Moreover, the investigation of causal mechanisms is accomplished through a combination of 
several disciplines in social/political science. In addition, the analysis investigates terms as 
power, institutions, and social structures, for example, how the political landscape appeared 
during the democratisation of the countries. These investigations have to be understood in 
the concrete historical context mixed with cultural, political, economic, and sociological 
factors (Jespersen 2004:150). This means that the historical context in the mix of other factors 
is included in the analysis, if it provides an understanding of curtain decisions, positions, 
narrative, etc. For example, the minimal transitional justice Slovakia has initiated cannot be 
understood without clarifying political factors such as the role of Prime Minister Meciar in the 
1990s.   
The methodological tool provided by critical realism in this investigation and analysis of 
causal mechanisms is retroduction. The method is a combination of deduction and induction 
and is similar to abduction. The method is based on finding the particular premise to a 
conclusion. In this case, the democratisation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia is the 
conclusion, and the particular premises are the possible explanations of this phenomenon 
such as transitional justice and the prospect of EU membership (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 
2008:61).  
The question is then, how to know that the identified mechanism and structures are the right 
ones. In critical realism, the ontology of the field of research is the guiding methodology in the 
investigation and analyse of the causal mechanisms (Jespersen 2004:160). This means that 
there are no scientific criteria to validate, if the identified mechanisms are the right ones. This 
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has caused critique from positivists, which is presented here by Kurki (2007): 
 “For positivists talking about “deep ontology” opens up the avenue of unscientific 
statements: we cannot simply come up with “deep ontological conceptualisations 
of causes of democratic peace in the absence of clear criteria for determining why 
these conceptualisations are better than others” (Kurki 2007:370). 
However, this critique of critical realism misses the crucial fact that social science is an open 
system, which is constantly changing and being influenced. Claiming that the evaluation of 
empirical data should be done through the acknowledgement of systemised criteria, puts up a 
fixed methodology that would only work in closed systems produced in laboratories (Kurki 
2007:370-371, Jespersen 2004:160-161). Moreover, the required evaluation of empirical data 
– according to positivism – would only include observable data and thus only work in the 
above-mentioned closed systems where causality relates to empirical regularity. 
Hence, the critique by the positivists is not taking into account that the society is constantly 
changing. “We cannot swim in the same lake twice” (Jespersen 2004:147) because the water 
will be different, the earth will have eroded more, there might have been an earthquake, etc. 
Thus, it is never possible to determine that the found causal mechanisms are the only ones or 
the most important ones, as it is required by positivism and their scientific criteria. However, 
an interdisciplinary study that includes the terms of power, institutions, and social structures, 
and understands the historical context, is able to investigate causal mechanisms for which 
there is “reason to believe” or “good reason to believe” that they exist (Jespersen 2004:160). 
This means that this project would never be able to conclude the exact reasons for the 
democratisations of Czech Republic and Slovakia, but through the analysis, it outlines if there 
is good reason to believe that transitional justice is influencing democratisation. 
 
 
2.2. Case Study 
In the analysis of the importance of transitional justice in democratisation, a case study 
delivers the empirical inquiry to “investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context” (Yin 1994:13). This means that the case study demands that the analysis of 
transitional justice in democratisation is analysed within the specific context of the Czech 
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Republic and Slovakia. Moreover, as the two countries had different approaches to 
transitional justice, the case study looks to cover the phenomena between the communist past 
and democratic present focusing on the contextual conditions.  
My research strategy in order to answer the question of the importance of transitional justice 
in democratisations is by conducting a few case study. The advantage of conducting a few case 
study to answer my research question is the explanatory approach, which becomes available 
by undertaking a few case study. This approach focuses on operational links throughout 
history and not only incidences or frequencies (Yin 1994:3-4,6). Hence, in the analysis of the 
democratisations of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, my research strategy opens up for 
analysing how events, decisions, actors, etc. through the time of democratisation in the 
countries influenced the processes that culminated in the situation today (Yin 1994:8). 
The two cases are the Czech Republic and Slovakia, because they share the common past of 
being one country, the Czechoslovak Federal Republic, from 1918 to 19921, and a communist 
past from 1948-1989. The two countries split on 1 January 1993 when the peaceful velvet 
divorce of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic became a reality. After four years together in the 
political and economic transition from the totalitarian Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR), 
the two countries separately started each of their transitions (Shepherd 2000:3,127). Hence, 
the history of the two cases ensures a strong comparative analysis of the importance of 
transitional justice in democratisation, because the commonality within the two countries 
works as a control mechanism for the concluding explanations of the democratisation.  
 
2.2.1. Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic, the start of the political and economic transformation came with Vaclav 
Klaus, who continued his position as the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic in 
Czechoslovakia. He was successful in the first years of the Czech transition and his economic 
reforms in the new country created the perception that Klaus was “turning a rusty old 
communist economy into gold with a breath-taking speed and efficiency” (Shepherd 2000:65).  
                                                        
1 Czechoslovakia was divided as Czech Republic and Slovakia from 1939 to 1945, where the Czech Republic was 
occupied by Nazi-Germany and Slovakia independent as a Nazi-German puppet regime (Shepherd 2000:16).  
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Moreover, the country initiated and continued one of the most comprehensive policies in 
dealing with the past among all post-communist countries in the period of 1992 to 2010. The 
transitional justice of the Czech Republic attempted to: 
“prosecute perpetrators of crimes committed in the previous regime, 
nationalised the property of the Communist Party, implemented a 
comprehensive reparation and rehabilitation programme for former political 
prisoners, adopted the first lustration law which discharged the collaborators 
of the previous regimes from positions of influence, offered unlimited access 
to the archives of the secret police, and accordingly adopted other measures 
which contributed to the rewriting of the country’s modern history” (David 
2012:762). 
Despite economic problems in the late 1990s, the country joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 
the great enlargement in 2004.  
 
2.2.2. Slovakia 
Slovakia likewise continued with their Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic in 
Czechoslovakia, Vladimir Meciar, still in power after the velvet divorce. However, the political 
and economic transition in the 1990s involved much greater problems for Slovakia than it did 
for the Czech Republic. The political transition towards democracy stopped under Meciar’s 
rule and, compared to the democratic developments initiated in Czechoslovakia, Slovakia was 
moving backwards. Meciar’s rhetoric towards the press was similar to the one used by the 
leaders of the CSSR, and even US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, warned that Slovakia 
could become a “black hole” in Central Europe  (Shepherd 2000:149,165). The darkest 
prognoses made of Meciar in power were that Slovakia was isolating itself from Western 
Europe with no prospect of joining the EU and NATO and that the country had a leadership 
comparable with Lukashenko’s Belarus and even Milosevic. Moreover, the country 
internationally became known as “… a less promising country whose economy is difficult to 
reform and whose democratic institutions are unstable” (Robertson 2003:380). 
Concerning the initiation of a process of transitional justice, the Czechoslovak federal 
lustration law was never implemented in Slovakia and only a few of the other transition 
measures were implemented. František Mikloško, deputy of the Slovak parliament for the 
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Catholic Democratic Movement (KDH), expressed, in 2002, this lack of transitional justice as 
follows: “It is remarkable that all post-communist states in Europe have institutions for 
dealing with the past. World-wide, only four countries lack such institutions: North Korea, 
China, Cuba, and Slovakia” (quoted in Kunicova & Nalepa 2006:8). However, this statement is 
exaggerated and not completely true, but it gives insight into one politician’s perception of the 
lack of transitional justice in the country.  
Nevertheless, Slovakia did develop a democracy, and became member of the NATO and the EU 
in 2004. Hence, other factors than a process of transitional justice influenced a 
democratisation of Slovakia.  
 
2.2.3. Process-tracing methods 
With the clarified aim of this project to analyse if transitional justice is important for 
democratisations, the project applies a version of process-tracing methods. These methods 
enable an analysis of the causal mechanisms that affected the process from a totalitarian state 
to a democracy. Three paths within process-tracing are developed by Beach & Pedersen 
(2013). These are ‘theory-testing’, ‘theory-building’, and ‘explaining-outcome’. Below, I 
present the three paths and argue why explaining-outcome process-tracing delivers the tools 
specifically useful in the analysis of the importance of transitional justice in the 
democratisation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
The process-tracing method ‘theory-testing’ would allow the project to analyse the problem 
statement as a theoretical hypothesis and test ‘transitional justice is important for 
democratisation’ in the two cases. However, the method does not deliver the tools to go 
further in the analysis and to investigate other causes influencing the democratisation (Beach 
& Pedersen 2013:11,15). Hence, by theory-testing as a method, the conclusion will be either 
that transitional justice is important for democratisation, or that it is not important for the 
democratisation. However, as outlined in the description of the two cases, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia had two different pathways to democracy. An analysis built around the testing of 
a theoretical hypothesis would therefore not be sufficient to actually answer the question of 
the importance of transitional justice in the democratisation in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. 
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Moreover, as mentioned above, critical realism is focused on investigating and analysing the 
ontological “underworld” or real domain by retroduction/abduction (cf. Critical Realism). 
This means that a deductive conclusion that the theory is “proved”, would not go into depth 
with respect to the ontological field of research, but analyse events and phenomena on the 
actual domain.  
‘Theory-building’ process-tracing is similar to theory-testing as it also has a theory-centric 
approach to case studies, but the method takes the empirical data before theory. This 
inductive X-Y centric approach analyses and elaborates on already accepted and known 
theoretical assumptions. Hence, the method builds generalising theoretical explanations from 
empirical evidence and develops a general causal mechanism from the facts of each of the 
chosen cases. However, as it is the case with theory-testing process tracing, both methods are 
aiming at generalising the causal mechanisms found in the few studies through a case 
selection focusing on large-n studies analyses (Beach & Pedersen 2013:146-147).  
The aim of this project is not to find general causal mechanisms in the process from 
communist totalitarian state to democratisation across Central and Eastern Europe, but to 
analyse the causal mechanisms in the two chosen cases, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The 
selection of cases has not been conducted through a positivist quantitative process, but 
through a qualitative approach and based on their common past in CSSR and their transition 
to democracy. This allows an explorative case-centric approach that analyses the influence of 
transitional justice and the EU in the democratisations in the cases of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia.  
Therefore, in order to analyse the causal mechanisms presented in the two chosen cases, 
‘explaining-outcome’ process-tracing delivers the most useful tools. This method has the 
ambitions of a more case-centric approach by working with minimal sufficient explanation of 
single cases. The aim is not to be able to generalise the findings, but to deliver a specific 
explanation of the causal mechanisms linking X and Y in the few case studies (Beach & 
Pedersen 2013:18-21). Moreover, to deliver this specific explanation of causal mechanisms, 
the analysis focuses on theoretical causal mechanisms that are understood in a broader sense 
(Beach & Pedersen 2013:26). Hence, the ‘explaining-outcome’ approach analyses causal 
mechanisms through a constant interaction between the theoretical hypothesis and observed 
regularities in line with retroduction in critical realism. Thereby, the analysis interacts with 
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the theories of transitional justice and normative power Europe, and the empirical data in the 
investigation of causal mechanisms of the democratisation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Furthermore, the specific focus on explaining each of the two cases enables a subsequent 
comparative analysis of the two pathways to democracy afterwards. This is with respect to 
the argumentation in ‘explaining-outcome’ process-tracing that the in-depth analysis of the 
democratisation of each country is the combination of observations and case-specific 
knowledge. This means that the analysis includes both systematic and non-systematic 
mechanisms. To be able to compare the two cases afterwards, the mechanisms are 
distinguished by the likelihood of playing a role in another case. If a certain mechanism is 
considered not to be influential in another case, it is characterised as a non-systematic case-
specific mechanism, and hence as not comparable. Thus, the distinction of systematic 
mechanisms and case-specific mechanisms enables a comparison by combining it with 
‘explaining-outcome’ process-tracing (Beach & Pedersen 2013:35, 73-74).  
Nevertheless, to be able to analyse the importance of transitional justice in democratisations, 
the theoretical concept of democracy requires further definition. This concept is rarely ‘either-
or’ but rather in different variations and different states of development, and with a focus on 
qualitative empirical date in this project, the definitions will follow this pattern (Beach & 
Pedersen 2013: 46-47). 
The definition of democracy is from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and captures the main elements of a democracy. Furthermore, I use the definition in 
this project because it is a definition developed by an organisation working across the 
European continent and thereby comprising different types of democracies. 
“‘Democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly 
through free and fair elections. Democracy has as its foundation respect for the 
human person and the rule of law. Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of 
expression, tolerance of all groups. Democracy, with its representative and 
pluralist character, entails accountability to the electorate, the obligation of 
public authorities to comply with the law and justice administered impartially. No 
one will be above the law.” (OSCE 1990). 
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2.3. Comparative method 
To be able to analyse the influence of transitional justice on the democratic development of 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the analysis is comparing the two countries. The two 
countries derive from the totalitarian communist CSSR and both countries managed the 
political transition to democracies. Thus, X and Y are similar in the two cases as illustrated in 
figure 2.1. and 2.3. However, the countries diverged in their approach to transition, as 
clarified in Case Study.  
Because of these similarities and differences, the design of the comparison will be a ‘most 
different system design’ (MDSD). This design approaches cases where the outcome does not 
vary but the explanatory factor does, as illustrated in figures 2.1.-2.3. (Landman 2008:70).  
 + Democratic political transition - Democratic political transition 
+ Transitional justice   
- Transitional justice   Czechoslovakia 
Figure 2.1. The country 1989 
 + Democratic political transition - Democratic political transition 
+ Transitional justice Czech Republic  
- Transitional justice  Slovakia 
Figure 2.2. The countries in 1998 
 + Democratic political transition - Democratic political transition 
+ Transitional justice Czech Republic  
- Transitional justice Slovakia  
Figure 2.3. The countries today 
Moreover, the MDSD works with assumptions about underlying causal mechanisms or factors, 
which explain the common outcomes. J. Gerring (2007) criticises this approach of the MDSD 
because the method is not able to determine whether the causal mechanisms are central or 
important for the outcome that is analysed (Gerring 2007:139-144). However, as it is argued 
and elaborated in the section about critical realism, arguments like these are based on a 
positivist perception of empirical data. However, this approach is not considered applicable in 
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the field of social science, which is constantly changing and being influenced. This means that 
the importance of transitional justice in democratisation is analysed by a small-n study of the 
transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia investigated. The explaining-outcome process-
tracing gives the tools to analyse the cases for causal mechanisms, which are compared in a 
most different system design to deliver a sufficient answer to the research question: Is 
transitional justice important for democratisation? 
 
 
2.4. Empirical data 
As mentioned in chp. 1, Field of Research, there is not much research in the field of 
transitional justice in Central and Eastern Europe concerning the actual impact that 
transitional justice measures had on the democratisations. Therefore, I considered it as 
important to collect empirical data in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to investigate how the 
transitional justice measures influenced the democracies. Moreover, “explanation requires 
mainly interpretive and qualitative research to discover actor’s reasoning and circumstances 
in specific context” (Sayer 2000:24), and the interviews were in that respect helpful to 
broaden my understanding of the historical context mixed with political and sociologic factors 
(cf. Critical Realism).  
The conducted interviews are expert interviews. My focus in the selection of interviewees in 
Prague and Bratislava was therefore that these persons had professional experience with the 
transitional justice process of their country. This led to interviews with academic professors 
at the Metropolitan University in Prague and the Comenius University in Bratislava, and with 
academic staff at the Czech Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes and the Slovak 
Institute of Nation’s Memory. The use of expert interviews gave me two kinds of knowledge. 
Firstly, the interviewees contributed with knowledge that I would be able to find in other 
ways. Secondly, the interviewees, because of their positions, were able to contribute with 
knowledge that I would not have been able to find through other sources. Most particular, the 
insight into the processes of the Slovak transitional justice is hardly available without 
knowledge to the Slovak language (Kristensen 2010:282-284). A presentation of the 
interviewed people and their professional backgrounds are in Annex No. 1. 
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The interviews are semi-structured, which means that I defined the themes of the interviews, 
but in a rather flexible manner, allowing the interviewees to elaborate and add points of view 
important for the understanding of the transitional justice in the two countries. Concretely, I 
developed an interview-guide for each interview, where the themes of the interview were 
presented. Under each theme, the theoretical purpose is considered, and finally the questions 
are based on the theme and theoretical purpose. The questions are open to give the 
interviewees the opportunity to elaborate and clarify their answers. Among others, this led to 
my additional focus on the importance of the EU in the democratisation process, because the 
interviewees individually discussed the influence of transitional justice processes in a broader 
perspective (Kristensen 2010:282-284). The interview-guides are found in Annex No. 2-6.  
The interviews are not transcribed because the purpose of the analysis is not to investigate 
discourse and choice of words, but to use their professional experiences in the analysis and 
discussion of the importance of transitional justice in the democratisations. The reference in 
the analysis therefore gives the exact time of where the statements are to be found in the 
audio file of the interview in question.  
Besides the information I received from the interviews, the interviewees referred to several 
articles treating transitional justice in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, at both the 
Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes and Institute for Nation’s Memory, I received 
materials about the institutes, books, and videos. They have been useful for a broader 
understanding of the historical context.     
The interviewees were generally critical about the transitional justice processes that have 
been initiated in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This was not surprising in the case of 
Slovakia, but rather astonishing in the Czech case. Therefore, the opinions of the interviewees 
concerning the influence of the implemented transitional justice measures are discussed in 
the analysis. Furthermore, a complicated relationship between the government of Slovakia 
and the Institute for Nation’s Memory is considered in the opinions expressed by 
representatives of the Institute.   
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3. Theory 
In this section, I introduce the choices of theories in this project. The first part will elaborate 
on the theory about transitional justice and the influence criminal justice, reparation, open 
archive policy and lustration laws have on democratisation. The second part presents 
Normative Power Europe to include Europeanisation as a factor for democratisation. Lastly, in 
the operationalization of the theories I clarify how the presented theories enable answering 
the problem statement: Is transitional justice important for democratisation?  
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3.1. Transitional justice  
The concept of transitional justice in this project is defined as processes of judicial and non-
judicial measures implemented as responses to the wrongdoings of former repressive 
regimes. These responses are part of the societies’ “dealing with the past” and are both 
judicial and non-judicial as they embrace criminal justice, truth commissions, reparation 
programmes, lustration, and memorials. The field of transitional justice proposes that these 
types of policies promote a progressive history by “revisiting” the past to be able to move on 
and establish new and stable democracies (Mihr 2013:299, Teitel 2003:86, Sharp 2013:149). 
If the society is not confronting the wrongdoings of the past, the consequences of these abuses 
in the new society might threaten the democratic consolidation (Horne 2014:497). 
  
3.1.1. Introduction 
Transitional justice traces back to classical antiquity and the measures they used in changing 
regimes (Priban 2012:116). The introduction here though has its basis in post-World War I 
and the development within the field of transitional justice since then. The section below is 
highlighting three phases of this development.  
Phase one 
The first of the three phases started in the post-World War II period with a focus on 
international criminal accountability. Due to the bad experience from collective punishment of 
Germany after World War I, the initiated transitional justice linked to the process of 
denazification was now based on individual criminal responsibility. Moreover, during the 
post-World War II period, international law was developed through international treaties, 
conventions and constitutions, bringing international law to a level where it was believed it 
could guarantee the rule of law (Teitel 2003:72-74).  
Phase two 
A move towards the second phase of transitional justice came with the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Special for this phase, which also became a 
determining factor in phase three, was the focus on democratisation. Transitional justice 
became a tool to get the newly liberated states on a more democratic track (Sharp 2013:149).  
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During phase two, the approach of transitional justice shifted away from international 
criminal justice, as initiated during the post-World War II period, and put criminal justice on a 
national level. In particular, the new democracies in South America had national trials to gain 
legitimacy and to advance nation-state building. In addition, these national trials were 
equated with rule of law and modernisation (Teitel 2003:75-80,87). In the countries 
transitioning around the end of the Cold War, another fact influencing trials at the national 
level was the fact that the state often played a role in past wrongdoings. This fact created 
dilemmas, which were difficult to manage for ambitious justice projects (Fletcher & Weinstein 
2002:575). However, through a balance of the use of punishment and amnesties, the 
perception of transitional justice in the second phase managed to recognise these dilemmas in 
periods of political change. The dilemmas were countered by the creation of a new organ 
within transitional justice, the truth and reconciliation commissions. These commissions 
could offer a broader historical perspective rather than isolated cases as offered by trials. 
Moreover, as these commissions focused on peace and not accountability, the focus of 
transitional justice moved from the accountability through the rule of law to the preservation 
of peace (Teitel 2003:75-80,87).  
Phase three 
Today, transitional justice has become normalised in the sense that a process of transitional 
justice is no longer a legal solution for extraordinary cases as in phase one. The discourse 
within transitional justice moved with the situation of international relations, where weak 
states and small-scale wars are part of the contemporary political condition. The  
establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court in 1998 that enables the 
prosecution of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes under international law on 
a routine matter, is yet another symbol of the normalisation of transitional justice (Teitel 
2003:90). As the cases of transitional justice in the Czech Republic and Slovakia have the 
characteristics of the transitional justice discourse of phase two, there will not be a further 
elaboration of phase three here.  
 
3.1.2. Democratisation and Transitional Justice 
As presented in the field of research, central to transitional justice is development of 
democracy in transitional societies. Several measures form parts of such a process of 
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democratisation and each consist of dilemmas within the re-establishment of rule of law in 
the transition period. This section will elaborate on the transitional justice measures such as 
criminal justice, reparation, the opening of archives and lustration laws, which all advance 
democratisation.  
Criminal Justice 
Criminal justice plays a crucial role in the transition from a repressive regime to a democratic 
society, because transitional criminal justice “reinvent[s] the differences between illiberal and 
liberal regimes” (Teitel 2002:66). Hence, holding individuals responsible for wrongdoings in 
the past, builds democracy in the demonstration of upholding democratic values such as the 
rule of law and justice (Horne 2014:497).  
The argument for the use of punishment or trials is that it gives a way to express the 
legitimation of rule of law as a necessary part in a process of democratisation and, 
additionally, that it gives a way to express public condemnation of past violence. Hence, the 
society can use punishment and trials to draw a line between past tyranny and looking 
forward to starting a process of democratisation (David 2010:763, Teitel 2002:30). 
Nevertheless, as these trials also serve a political goal affecting political transition, they 
balance on a thin line between the accomplishment of the adherence to the rule of law and the 
risk of administering political justice. Thus, trials might backfire and risk sending a wrong 
message of political justice, if they are not conducted in a fair way (Teitel 2002:30).  
In order to overcome the risk of administering political justice, national trials have today 
mostly been replaced with international trials. This ensures criminal accountability to the 
successor regime, as justice is lifted above the politicised national context (Teitel 2002:31-
33). 
However, transitional criminal justice often creates a dilemma with respect to the question of 
how to ascribe criminal accountability in cases where the state was part of the past 
wrongdoings. In post-communist Central Europe, there was a consensus that the leadership of 
communism could be individually responsible for certain act of repression, as for example the 
violent suppressions of the uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and the Czechoslovak Spring in 
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1968. The dilemma with these prosecutions was then the statute of limitation2, which would 
question the reestablishment of rule of law (Teitel 2002:34-41). 
Throughout history, the sanctions based on criminal justice have been limited. In cases where 
the investigations were established to settle the wrongdoings of the past, they were often 
without any indictments, adjudications, or convictions. Where the investigations led to 
convictions, they were often followed by light punishment or no punishment at all. This was 
also the case in the post-communist transition of Central Europe, where only the Czech 
Republic and Germany had a few trials which, however, ended with suspension of the 
sentences (Teitel 2002:47-48). Nevertheless, as even limited sentencing already constitutes a 
symbol of the rule of law, it is still effective in its establishment. This symbol emerges during 
the investigations and prosecutions, because they go beyond the particular crime and shed 
light on the circumstances for the transition. Hence, even a limited sanctioning enables a 
confrontation with the past wrongdoings and the investigations even furthers a public 
condemnation of the wrongdoings. Moreover, the limited sanctioning can be the mediating 
factor in the dilemma of individual responsibility in cases of systematic wrongdoings by the 
former repressive regime in the transition to democratic rule (Teitel 2002: 49-51).  
Reparation 
Reparatory justice is here referred to as financial and material compensation, property 
restitution, judicial rehabilitation, and social acknowledgement of resistance to the former 
regime (David & Yuk-pin 2005:396). In the transition of the Central and Eastern European 
countries, reparation was also part of the economic transformations from communist to 
capitalist economy. In this respect, the implementation of the property right was particularly 
emblematic, as it combined the new regime’s acknowledgement of the wrongdoings 
committed by the communists and the privatisation that was crucial for the economic 
transition (David & Yuk-pin 2005:410, Teitel 2002:137). Concerning the transition to 
democracy, reparations are increasingly important in cases where punishment of the former 
regime is not possible due to a fragile power balance. In such a case, the reparations 
symbolise the successor regime’s recognition of the victims of the former regime’s 
wrongdoings (Stan & Nedelsky 2013a:74) and “draw[s] a line on the past” (Teitel 2002:137).  
                                                        
2 Statute of limitation defines the maximum time after an event that legal proceeding can be initiated (Judicial 
Council of California)  
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Furthermore, the reparatory justice’s forward-looking approach promotes peace and 
reconciliation through several measures of acknowledgement (financial, juridical, and social). 
However, reparatory justice is also backward-looking, as it compensates victims for 
wrongdoings committed by the former regime (Teitel 2002:134). This raises a dilemma 
concerning collective guilt, because reparations give recognition of the victims’ rights, but do 
not individualise the wrongdoings (Teitel 2002:146).  
Thus, reparations allow the successor regime to acknowledge wrongdoings of the past. This is 
important in transitional societies, where punishments are not a way to draw a line at the 
past. However, reparative transitional justice constitutes dilemmas concerning collective guilt. 
Opening of Archives  
In the case of the transition of the post-communist societies, the comprehensive archives of 
the secret services in each country became part of the debate about the right approach to the 
countries’ transition. In other words, what should be done with the huge amount of 
information about opponents to the former regime, journalists, artists, etc., and just ordinary 
citizens collected by the Secrete State Service and their collaborators (Teitel 2002:96). 
On the one hand, a solution would have been to burn the files and to let history begin again. 
This would have protected the society from an eventual continuation of the totalitarian legacy, 
as the new regime then would have the power to destroy personal reputations by leaking 
files, just as was done by the former totalitarian regime. However, burning the files would 
have been a radical choice, as the files covered a long period of national history and were 
elements of the national identity (Teitel 2002:111). Likewise, burning the files would have 
limited knowledge about the wrongdoings, which influences the possibility of a change in the 
future and the chances of a democratic transition (Priban 2012:117). Furthermore, burning 
the archive would not have necessarily limited suspicions about ties to the former regime 
(Teitel 2002:111). 
The decision to save the archives opened yet another discussion about the public access to the 
files. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania argued that public access to the files might lead 
to witch hunts and danger, based on what they categorise as unreliable files3. These countries 
decided to seal the files for 30 to 40 years (Welsh 1996:418).  
                                                        
3 The reliability of the files of the secret service has been questioned due to an increase of the number of 
collaborators before deadlines for quotas of collaborators, and moreover, an unknown amount of the archives 
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However, in countries with open or partly open archives, there are no reports on any violence 
or social revolt as a consequence of revealed names of collaborators or other information 
accessible in the files (Stand & Nedelsky 2013a:4). Moreover, having the files open for 
citizens, the transitional societies thereby had an opportunity to open up for the truth of the 
communists’ wrongdoings in order to confront future challenges in the process of 
democratisation (Yoder 2007:60). Open archives also decrease the risk of political misuse of 
the files for blackmail or media leaks, and prevent the fabrication of new files for political 
gaining (Welsh 1996:418). Even though the opening of the archives does not equally 
delegitimise the communist regime in the way criminal justice does, the open archives would 
be the second best solution in these cases where the power was negotiated between 
communist leaders and future democratic leaders (David 2010:763). 
In unified Germany, the response to the repression, which depended on secrecy, was justice 
based on exposure by opening the files. Nevertheless, the freedom of information to see one’s 
own file was not necessarily desirable, when it revealed a colleague, friend or even a family 
member as an informer (Yoder 2007:74). 
In other post-communist societies, the files were not solely opened or partly opened to 
vindicate victims. Considerations about the desired promotion and assurance of the historical 
and political evaluation of the secret police also influenced the decision, as the files helped the 
purging of the state apparatus (Stan & Nedelsky 2013a:1, Teitel 2002: 97-98). 
In general, in the post-communist societies the archives were the catalyst for new definitions, 
which limited the state’s access to the citizens and expanded the citizens’ access to the state as 
a step towards more open societies (Teitel 2002:102). Hence, the transition of post-
communist societies has to be seen in the light of the historical justice after the communist 
rule. These transitions were, in contrary to post-military dictatorships in Latin America, 
without truth commissions. The purpose of the truth commissions in the post-military 
dictatorships in Latin America was to clarify the truth about the “desaparecidos”, the people 
who disappeared, during the dictatorships. In the post-communist societies, however, the 
repression by the state was characterised by a totality of state control over the construction of 
historical events. Therefore, official narratives were largely avoided in favour of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
were destroyed in the late 1980’s. Hence, some names of collaborators do not have a file, so that circumstances 
for collaboration and the question whether the person gave information cannot be checked, leaving the chance of 
innocents being on the list of collaborators (Killingsworth 2010b:281, Stan & Nedelsky 2013:2-4). 
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establishment of state history through the files (Teitel 2002:101-102). These historical 
institutes control public investigations, give citizens access to the state, and protect their 
privacy. Thereby, the historical institutes managing the files have the same purpose as the 
truth commissions, namely to support the emerging democracies (Priban 2012:117-118.  
Lustration Laws 
As presented in the previous section, specific to the post-communist societies was the fact 
that their transition did not include truth commissions, because the countries already had 
huge amounts of documentation about the repression in the archives. Instead, lustration laws, 
purging the public administrations for people connected with the State Security operating 
during communism, fulfilled the purpose of historical transitional justice. The new democratic 
institutions and their representatives had to gain trust from the population. Hence, lustration 
embraces the personal aspect of the transitional justice, or the ‘simple truth’ (Priban 
2012:118).  
The reason for the purging of the state apparatus is to provide a basis for democratic 
transition within the rule of law by correcting injustice from the former regime and by giving 
the foundation for investigations into the past (Welsh 1996:414). Moreover, lustration is used 
to reassure citizens that the state takes moral and political responsibility for what happened 
in the past and to gain political legitimacy (Killingsworth 2010a:79-80).  
The purging was enforced thanks to the knowledge of the identities of former collaborators 
revealed in the archives, and the law on lustration was adopted in order to clarify which 
positions in the state apparatus required a background without any ties to the former secret 
police. Persons with a background in the secret police would be fired or not able to apply to 
these positions (Teitel 2002:98). In the case of Czechoslovakia, the lustration law also barred 
former communist functionaries from holding certain positions. This law attracted criticism 
from the Council of Europe for promoting collective guilt (Welsh 1996:415).  
However, the implementation of lustration laws creates certain dilemmas. Given that the files 
are (again) under governmental control, these files continue influencing the politics of the 
concerning societies: “The past states histories were still being used to punish, to exclude and 
to disqualify” (Teitel 2002:99). Moreover, as mentioned in the section above, the reliability of 
the files can be questioned and in many cases, files were destroyed before the fall of 
communism (Welsh 1996:417). Lastly, lustration laws lack an element of reconciliation and 
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are accused of depriving some citizens’ of their constitutional rights (Killingsworth 
2010b:280). 
Thus, on the one hand, lustration laws grant the new regime legitimacy and increase the 
citizens’ trust in the new democratic institutions by not having employees who continue from 
the former totalitarian regime. On the other hand, lustration laws are criticized for not 
promoting democratisation by an exclusion of some citizens. Moreover, the purging highly 
depends on files, which in some occasions have a questionable reliability.  
 
 
3.2. Europeanisation 
The following section presents the theory of normative power Europe by Ian Manners. I 
consider the theory important for the analysis of the influence of the EU on the new 
neighbourhood that emerged after the fall of communism. The theory is able to analyse the 
role of the EU in the process of democratisation in the Czech Republic and Slovakia until their 
full membership in 2004. Moreover, the theory of normative power takes into account the 
influence of international actors on the democratisation in the two countries, which the 
theory of transitional justice does not elaborate.  
 
3.2.1. Normative Power Europe 
Scholars diffused the concept of normative power Europe in the post-Cold War era. The Cold 
War dominance of the Westphalian nation state and the high priority accorded to military 
force weakened with the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The breakdown of the ideological 
antipole was due to ideas and norms, not the traditional force of an empire, and opened up 
other understandings of the EU (Manners 2002:236-238).  
The historical context in which the EU was created, has to be taken into consideration in order 
to understand the reasons for its characterisation as a normative power. In the first half of the 
20th century, the European states experienced two devastating wars and a genocide. After the 
Second World War, the states were committed to re-establish Europe by “pooling their 
resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty…” (Treaty of Rome 1957:2). This 
important commitment has contributed to the development of the Union to an organisation, 
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which is characterized by a mix of supranational and international forms of governance. This 
system is new, different, and has not been seen before in history (Manners 2002:140).  
The highly elite-driven and treaty-based construction of this political entity gives priority to 
the rule of law. Consequently, the constitutional norms are a crucial element in the 
international identity of the EU. Even though the principles of peace, liberty, democracy, rule 
of law, and respect for human rights were not directly mentioned in the treaties before the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993, they were quoted explicitly in the Copenhagen declaration on the 
European identity back in 1973 (Manners 2002:240-241). In the post-Cold War period, this 
combination of the historical context and its hybrid policy demanded a commitment of the EU 
to focus on universal principles and norms in its relations with member states and the world 
(Manners 2009:11). 
Furthermore, analysing the power of the EU from the perspective of the theories of traditional 
great power and civilian power, the characterisation of the EU as a normative power becomes 
clearer. Throughout history, great powers have traditionally been recognised on the basis of 
their military capacities, even though it is not a requirement for recognition. Cases of 
emerging great powers without military capacity are rare. With respect to the military 
capacities of the EU, the developments within that field are fairly poor. There are common 
military operations based on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) under the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), but the capacity of these peace-keeping missions is 
limited, and the willingness of the member states (who are also NATO member states) to 
cooperate within the framework of the EU is low (Diez 2013:198, EEAS 2014, Manners 
2002:237). Hence, the power of the EU is not built on its military capacity and is different 
from a traditional great power (Diez 2013:199). 
The concept of civilian power leans towards the concept of normative power. However, there 
are crucial differences between the two concepts. Firstly, civilian power is recognised by its 
non-military, often economic means in pursuing self-interests. By contrast, the normative 
approach does not pursue self-interests, but binds itself to international norms despite the 
fact that these norms might contradict the own interests. Secondly, the normative power does 
not make use of economic means, but the diffusion of ideas (Diez 2013:197). Thus, “the EU 
represents a novel kind of power, which pursues normative aims (as opposed to self-interest 
material gains) through predominately normative means (as opposed to predominately 
military and economic means)” (Diez 2013:194). However, the differentiation between 
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foreign policy motivated by norms and foreign policy motivated by interest is very difficult, 
and illustrates how normative power co-exists with other forms of power (Diez 2013:197, 
Manners 2009:10).   
The Diffusion of Norms 
The normative foundation of the EU does not necessarily make the Union a normative power, 
unless the norms are diffused in international politics. The EU diffuses its norms most clearly 
in six ways (Manners 2002:244). 
Firstly, the contagion diffusion is the unintended diffusion of ideas and norms to other 
political actors. Secondly, the informational diffusion is strategic communication, e.g. 
initiatives from the President of the Commission. Thirdly, the institutionalisation of EU’s 
relationship to a third party, such as its membership in an international organisation or its 
enlargement is characterised as the procedural diffusion. Fourthly, transference diffusion 
occurs when the EU exchange goods, aid or trade with a third party, especially through 
financial means. Examples are the principles “more for more” and “less for less” in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), where democratisation gives financial rewards and 
de-democratisation leads to economic sanctions. Fifthly, when the EU is physically present in 
third states or international organisation, the EU is able to diffuse its norms directly, hence, an 
overt diffusion through e.g. the EU delegations and embassies of member states. The sixth way 
of the EU’s diffusion of norms is through cultural filter. This affects the impact of political 
learning and international norms in third states “leading to learning, adaption or rejection of 
norms” (Manners 2002:145). Hence, cultural filter interact between the construction of 
knowledge and the construction of political and social identity through the diffusion of norms. 
All these six ways of diffusing norms contribute to the normative power of the Union 
(Manners 2002:244-245). The focus in these intended and unintended ways of diffusing ‘what 
is normal’ is, that “persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or shame” 
increases a sustainable influence of the norms in a higher degree than by coercion or material 
motivations (Manners 2011:235). 
Thus, the understanding of the EU as a normative power is not only based on the historical 
context and the construction of the Union, but is also reflected by the diffusion of norms in 
international politics. In this perspective, the EU is more than a civil power, as the diffusion of 
norms not necessarily benefits the EU. The EU is a normative power not only because of what 
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it says or does, but also because of its particular identity (Manners 2002:253, Damro 
2012:684). 
 
 
3.3. Operationalization  
The theory presented above will constitute the theoretical approach to the investigation of 
causal mechanisms and structures between communism and democracy. Both the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia are today well-functioning democracies. According to the theory of 
transitional justice, this democratisation was facilitated by the implementation of transitional 
justice measures that confront the past to let the society move on. Based on the theory of 
transitional justice, the analysis treats the specific measures, i.e. criminal justice, lustration, 
reparation, and takes into account the political circumstances and the concrete historical 
context and sociologic factors that were present in the countries during the transition.  
To elaborate on the role of international actors in the democratisation of transitional 
countries, I analyse, in analysis part II, the influence of the EU on the democratisation of the 
two countries, with perspectives from the theoretical approach of normative power Europe. 
According to this theory, the EU, as a normative power, diffuses norms intentionally or 
unintentionally. The analysis will therefore analyse the cooperation, communication, 
association, negotiations, etc. between the EU, the Czech Republic and Slovakia to investigate 
the diffusion of norms and the impact of this diffusion on the democratisation.   
Thereby, the analysis answers the question, is transitional justice important for 
democratisation? 
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4. Analysis  
In the following chapter, I analyse the importance of transitional justice in the 
democratisation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As briefly mentioned in the Field of 
Research, the two countries had a very different approach to transitional justice. The Czech 
Republic initiated a comprehensive transitional justice process from the day of independence, 
whereas Slovakia passed more than a decade in independence before the first step towards 
confronting the past was initiated. The first part of this analysis therefore analyses the 
respective transitional justice processes to clarify their importance for the democratisation. In 
order to take into account the influence of international actors on the democratisation of the 
two countries, I analyse the role of the EU by the theory of normative power Europe in the 
second part of the analysis.  
The findings of the analysis are compared to the common past of the two countries in the 
Czechoslovak Federal Republic and the CSSR in order to determine the importance of 
transitional justice in the democratisation. 
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4.1. Part 1: Transitional justice in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
 
4.1.1. Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
One week after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, a student demonstration in 
Prague took place on 17 November 1989 and started what would afterwards be known as the 
Velvet Revolution or Gentle Revolution (Kralova 2014). The peaceful demonstration on the 
occasion of the International Students’ Day ended violently when the riot police blocked 
escape routes and beat the demonstrators. The incidence mobilised more people and until 10 
December, daily demonstrations throughout Czechoslovak cities put an end to the totalitarian 
communist regime that had been in power for more than four decades (Kralova 2014). The 
President of the State Gustav Husak negotiated his resignation and in late December 1989, 
Vaclav Havel was elected as the first non-communist president since the coup d’état in 1948 
(Wolchik 1999:438). Another important element in the immediate transition in 
Czechoslovakia was the Communist Party’s exceptionally weak position. That is why no 
‘round table negotiations’ with the old Communist Party were implemented, similarly to the 
immediate transition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In both cases, transitional 
justice processes could begin without any negotiated amnesties, contrary to the cases in 
Poland and Hungary (Sniegon 2013:110, Nedelsky 2009:37).  
Nevertheless, the state of democracy was fragile and policies to secure the democratic 
development were important. The first law to deal with the communist past was the Act on 
Rehabilitation approved in April 1990. The law invalidated judicial decisions that 
contradicted political and civic rights guaranteed in the constitution as well as in international 
agreements and accords. It eliminated the disproportional hardship that resulted from the 
repression. It provided social rehabilitation and material compensation. Finally, it determined 
the legal repercussions against the persons who violated the laws. In other words, people 
could be prosecuted for crimes committed during communism even in cases where the statute 
of limitation would normally apply. The postponing of the statute of limitation was important, 
because most of the violent crimes in Czechoslovakia happened from 1948 to the end of 
1950s, and hence the statute of limitations would have been an obstacle in the prosecutions 
(Shepherd 2000:23, David 2012:768). Thus, crimes committed in the communist regime and 
redressed in the law would not expire before 1 January 1995 (David 2012:768). In 1991, the 
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Act on Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation was approved, entitling more people to financial and 
adequate compensation (David 2012:769). 
Furthermore, there was a common agreement that agents and collaborators within the State 
Security (StB) should be purged from decision-making and influential positions, but no 
systematic programmes were initiated. As a consequence, a non-systematic, public and 
chaotic lustration process characterised the first year of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic. 
The situation was difficult to change because the political landscape in the first years after the 
collapse of communism consisted of many small parties, so agreements and compromises 
were not easy to be found. However, this situation changed when the Slovak Christian 
Democrats and Civic Movement and the Czech Civic Forum initiated a lustration law that 
would be bureaucratic, confidential and out of the reach of the public audience (Williams 
2003:6). 
An obstacle for lustration laws was the fact that it was criticized for violation of the human 
rights, of promoting collective guilt, and of being a simple form of revenge. In order to avoid 
these accusations, the argumentations in favour of the bill had to include reasons relating to 
security and not morality (Williams 2003:6-8). The quote by the Constitutional Court of 
Czechoslovakia, mentioned in the Field of Research, emphasises exactly this argument of 
security: 
“Every State, especially one which had been obliged to suffer the violation of 
basic rights and freedoms by the totalitarian power for more than forty years 
has the right to apply such legislative measures which aim to foil the risk of 
subversion on the return of, or possible relapse into the totalitarian regime in 
order to establish a democratic system” (quoted in: Teitel 2002:166-167). 
Hence, the Constitutional Court uses the word risk to emphasise that the implementation of 
lustration law is a matter of the security of the democratic development of the country.  
The Federal Parliament passed the law on lustration in 1991 (Nedelsky 2009:37). This law 
purged the state apparatus from people who had a past in one (or several) of the following 
categories: 1) Agents and collaborators of the StB. 2) Leaders of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia (KSC) in the period from 1948 to 1989 (except the years 1968-69) at the 
central or district level. 3) Persons who were involved in the political direction of the National 
Security Corps (SNB). 4) Members of the paramilitary organisation Working Militia, 
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approximately around 100.000 people. 5) Anyone who had studied at the high-level police 
school in the Soviet Union or KGB agents in the CSSR. 6) Members of the Action Committee of 
the National Front, which were the 15 people responsible for the coup d’état in 1948 or 
members of the Normalisation Committee after 21 August 1968 (Gonzalez-Enriquez 
2001:226, Williams 2003:13-15). A person with a past within one (or several) of the 
categories mentioned above received a positive lustration certificate.  
However, the transitional justice of Czechoslovakia was a limited process because separation 
movements, especially in Slovakia, became more and more influential. The 17 July 1992 was 
the breaking point when the Slovak National Council approved the declaration on 
independence stating "We, the democratically elected Slovak National Council, solemnly 
declare that 1,000 years' effort of the Slovak nation for sovereignty has come to fruition." The 
reaction from Prague came minutes later when President Vaclav Havel announced his 
resignation and consequently ended the 74 years old state Czechoslovakia only 6 month later 
(The Independent 1992). 
The 1 January 1993 saw the velvet divorce of Czechoslovakia and the independence of the two 
new countries Czech Republic and Slovakia became reality. After four years together in a 
political and economic transition from the totalitarian CSSR, the two countries could now 
separately continue each of their transitions (Shepherd 2000:3,127). 
Czech Republic  
In the Czech Republic, the start of the political and economic transformation came with Vaclav 
Klaus, who continued in his position as Prime Minister from the Czech Republic in the 
Czechoslovak Federal Republic (Shepherd 2000:65). Klaus was part of the liberal and neo-
liberal groupings that dominated the political sphere in the 1990s. He received large support, 
especially because of his economic reforms in the new country “turning a rusty old communist 
economy into gold with a breath-taking speed and efficiency” (Shepherd 2000:65).  
The country also successfully continued the transitional justice path that was started in 
Czechoslovakia. In 1993, the parliament of the Czech Republic approved the Act on Illegality 
of the Communist Regime and Resistance Against It. It was a rather radical act, and despite 
not being a penal law but more a moral declaration, it questioned the responsibility of the 
communist regime. The act shifted the focus from the victims to the perpetrators (Sniegon 
2013:111). Moreover, the act stated that the people carrying the main responsibility for the 
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wrongdoings in the communist regime were the leading officials of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party and their supporters (Priban 2007:321, Act 198/1993sb). The act was 
important for the further processes of transitional justice and led to the establishment of the 
Coordination Centre for the Documentation and Investigation of Violence Against the Czech 
Nation in 1995 (European Commission 2013a). Still today, this Coordination Centre plays an 
important role in the investigation of crimes committed under the communist rule between 
25 February 1948 and 29 December 1989, and their investigations led to several prosecutions 
and sentences (Policie CR 2014). Moreover, the Coordination Centre was the predecessor of 
The Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes (European Commission 2013a).  
The Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes (USTR) was established in 2007, and has 
been managing the archive of the StB ever since. Besides investigating the repression during 
communism, it also manages the period from 1938 to 1945, during which Nazi-Germany 
occupied the Czech Republic. The USTR studies the time of communism and the crimes 
committed by state bodies such as the StB and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It 
studies the liquidation of democracy under communist regime through both internal and 
external factors, and the resistance against this process. It renders the documents about the 
communist regime and its activities, especially of the StB, public. It documents the crimes 
under communism and publishes and informs the Czech population about these findings 
(USTR 2014a). Moreover, by publishing books and videos and organising events about the 
repression during communism, the USTR seeks to influence the memory of the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic by facilitating reflection about the past. 
The Czech Republic implemented one of the most comprehensive transitional justice 
processes among all post-communist countries. Besides the above-mentioned lustration law 
and reparations, the country also held trials and prosecutions and implemented an open 
archive policy.  
Slovakia 
As the Czech Republic continued with their Prime Minister from the republic in 
Czechoslovakia after the independence, so did Slovakia. Vladimir Meciar from the party 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) was the first Prime Minister of an independent 
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Slovakia.4 Meciar was a controversial leader, but popular among Slovaks. The European 
Parliament accused him on several occasions of an authoritarian rule (European Parliament 
1998) and he was removed from office by the Parliament twice. The first removal took place 
in 1991, due to accusations of having destroyed incriminating archive material about his 
relationship to the StB from the 1970s (Nedelsky 2004:89). In 1994, a mistrust vote in the 
Parliament removed him from office (U.S. Department of State 1994). Nevertheless, he was re-
elected as Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic in the 1992 and as Prime Minister of Slovakia 
in the 1994 elections.  
Concerning the transitional justice process, the commonality between the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia ended with the velvet divorce on 1 January 1993. Contrary to the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia did not have politicians pushing for an implementation of transitional justice 
measures (Nedelsky 2004:65-66). However, an Act on the illegality of the communist regime 
was passed by the Parliament in 1996. The Act was similar to the Czech Act on the illegality of 
the communist regime. But the Slovak version was a modified edition and the Communist 
Party was defined as “a party which did not prevent its members from committing crimes”, 
quite contrary to the original definition stating that “[The Communist Party was] a criminal 
organisation responsible for violating human rights and spreading terror” (Fisher 1996). 
Hence, the wording is not as strong as in the original Czech version. However, as Peter Brnak 
(HZDS) expressed after the passing of the bill, "the parliament, in which there are 92 former 
communists, found the strength to approve” (quoted in Fisher 1996). The Slovak Parliament 
consists of 150 members. Five years later, the former dissident Jan Langos proposed the Act 
on the Nation’s Memory, which was passed by Parliament in 2002. 
This Act on the Nation’s Memory also established the Nation’s Memory Institute (UPN) as a 
compromise between Langos and the Parliament. Langos wanted “the Nation’s Memory 
Institute – Office for the Prosecutions of Crimes against the Slovak Nation”, which should have 
had educational tasks and prosecutors working there, but the Parliament did not approve. 
Therefore, the compromise was the Nation’s Memory Institute as a public-law institution and 
non-profit organisation established by the Slovak state. The UPN covers two periods of 
repression, Fascism and Communism from 1939-1989 (UPN 2012)5. Among others, the 
mission of the UPN is to do research within the periods of repression and to evaluate the 
                                                        
4 Slovakia was formally independent from 1938-1945, however as a Nazi-German puppet regime. (Shepherd 
2000:18)  
5 The material is not public, but can be provided by the author. 
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reasons for the loss of freedom and the involvement of national sympathisers. Moreover, the 
UPN investigates crimes committed and not prosecuted during the times of repression and 
hands over evidence to the General Prosecutors Office. The UPN renders these prosecutions 
public. It provides the authorities with information, collaborates with other memory institutes 
in the region and promotes ideas of freedom and democracy (UPN 2014a).  
 
4.1.2. Criminal Justice 
According to the theory of transitional justice, criminal justice is an important element in the 
democratisation because it re-establishes the difference between the liberal and illiberal 
regime in the re-invention of the rule of law. In Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, the rule of law was enforced through trials and punishment of criminality during the 
illiberal regime.  
However, it is important in this process for a successful re-invention of the rule of law, that 
there is no intervention from politics as this risk the re-establishment of the rule of law and 
hence the democratic transition (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Transitional Justice). This was considered 
in the immediate Czechoslovak transition, where communists were not prosecuted because 
the new elite did not want mass prosecutions and imprisonments. The political fear was that 
this could be interpreted as revenge and thus as damaging the re-invention of the rule of law 
and democracy (Just 2014, min. 19:30).  
A common characteristic for the repression of the communist regimes throughout the region 
was that the final decade of communism was characterised as “soft “or “civilised” violence. In 
other words, severe human rights abuses such as murder, torture, slavery, which had 
characterised the repression in the 1940s and 1950s, were reformed to an all-encompassing 
surveillance system and physiological repression by the policy of normalisation6. In 
Czechoslovakia, the repression in the 1970s and 1980s could be imprisonment, the loss of 
work, the elimination of children’s opportunity to go to university, allocation of people to 
smaller apartments, etc. (Shepherd 2000:30-31). In the search for justice and re-
establishment of the rule of law by prosecutions of severe human rights abuses, 
Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic and Slovakia were therefore confronted with the 
                                                        
6 Normalisation was the term describing the policy implemented after the Czechoslovak Spring in 1968 until 
1989. The progressive reforms under Alexander Dubcek’s “socialism with a human face” were withdrawn and 
the society was purged for the people who had supported the reforms (Shepherd 2000:30-31). 
41 
 
dilemma of the statute of limitation. For these reasons, the above-mentioned Rehabilitation 
Act implemented by the Czechoslovak Parliament in 1990 listed crimes where the statute of 
limitations would not apply until 1995. Afterwards, the Czech Republic passed the Act on the 
illegality of the communist regime that stated that the statute of limitations would not apply 
for crimes committed during the illegal communist regime (David 2012:768). The Slovak Act 
on the illegality of the communist regime likewise exempted the statute of limitations.  
In the Czech Republic, the Act gave the possibility to hold trials and punish individuals for the 
wrongdoings. In this way, public condemnation of the wrongdoings by the communist regime 
could be expressed and a line could be drawn on the past and look forward (cf. chp. 3, Theory: 
Transitional Justice). However, the Coordination Centre for Documenting and Investigating 
Crimes of Communism with the mandate to investigate cases of criminality committed during 
the communist regime had to drop more than 2000 cases from 1995 – 2008. Within the same 
period, the Coordination Centre investigated over 3000 cases whereof the cases of only 192 
persons were handed over to the District Attorney. In the end, the District Attorney initiated 
prosecutions of 100 persons, but only 30 were found guilty and only eight received prison 
sentence. The remaining 22 persons received suspended sentencing with probation period 
(Stan & Nedelsky 2013:337).  
The fact that the severe human rights abuses dated from 1948 to the start of 1960s presented 
a problem to the prosecutions. Hence, the decision not to prosecute communists in the 
immediate transition became an obstacle for the later prosecution, because some of the 
prosecuted persons were old, sick or dead, as it was a similar case for many of the witnesses 
(Just 2014, min: 19:10). 
Nevertheless, according to Just, only two or three of these 30 convicted people were actually 
responsible for giving the orders. "We [the Czech Republic] did not sue the people who are 
really responsible” (Just 2014, min: 15:32). The prosecuted persons were mainly people that 
listened to orders, for example border guards. 
“They were just the soldiers and a soldier is required to listen to the order he 
gets. So what I think the Czech transitional justice is missing very much is actually 
really asking the people who were responsible for the regime to take this 
responsibility and to face criminal prosecution" (Just 2014, min: 16:25).  
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However, according to Teitel (chp. 3, Theory: Transitional Justice), the sanctioning is not the 
crucial element for criminal justice, because even a limited sanctioning establishes 
denouement of the past wrongdoings by investigations focusing on perpetrators and victims. 
A survey conducted by David (2012) in 2010 asked 1,079 Czechs whether they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement that “the largest injustices of the previous regime were 
resolved.” 36,6 % agreed to the statement and 30,7 % disagreed. With respect to the success 
of criminal justice, 22 % considered the prosecutions of crimes of communism successful and 
42,8 % considered them unsuccessful (David 2012:773-776).  
In Slovakia, the Act on the illegality of the communist regime also opened up for prosecutions 
where the statute of limitations would normally apply. However, contrary to the Czech 
Republic, the Act in Slovakia did not encourage the same number of prosecutions. The first 
and only conviction in Slovakia concerned the last chief of the StB, Alojz Lorenc. Actually, he 
had already been convicted and sentenced to four years of imprisonment in the Czech 
Republic in Czechoslovakia in 1992. However, he never went to prison because he lived in the 
Slovak Republic, which became independent shortly after the conviction, which he refused to 
leave afterwards. In 2001, the Bratislava Military Court convicted him for abuse of office and 
sentenced him to 15 months of suspended prison and probation for the following three years 
(Nedelsky 2004:78-79). Besides the trial on Lorenc, Vasil Bilak was prosecuted for signing the 
“invitation letter” asking the Warsaw Pact to invade Czechoslovakia and the repression of  the 
1968 uprisings. However, the prosecutions were withdrawn due to lack of evidence (Jasek 
2014, min: 05.08).  
Since 2002, investigations of non-punished criminal acts committed during communism have 
been handed over to the UPN. The head of the Slovak Helsinki Committee, Miroslav Kusy, 
expressed in 2002, prior to the passing of the Act on the Nation’s Memory, that "there was a 
need for the crimes of the past to be clearly recognized and defined" (Holt 2002). It was hoped 
that the UPN would be able to promote criminal justice. However, the UPN faces two 
challenges. Firstly, as it is the case in the Czech Republic, many of the prosecuted persons and 
witnesses in Slovakia are also old, sick or dead, which limits the possibilities of criminal 
justice. Secondly, the UPN in Slovakia has additional problems fulfilling its mission “to prompt 
criminal prosecution of crimes and criminal offences” (UPN 2014a). According to Jasek, this is 
because either the investigations that the UPN hands over to the General Prosecutors Office 
are denied due to lack of evidence, or the UPN never receives a reply from the Office. The 
43 
 
situation is very complex, because former communists are still in high positions in the legal 
system. According to Jasek, this fact has a negative influence on the criminal justice system 
(Jasek 2014, min. 07:20), which Jasek expresses in general is very unsatisfying (Jasek 2014, 
min. 04:36). 
Looking at the re-invention of the rule of law in Slovakia after independence, the Act on the 
illegality of the communist regime established similar tools for prosecution, as it was the case 
with the Czech Act. Nevertheless, the Slovak Act was not able to actually initiate criminal 
justice by prosecutions, trials and punishment due to the lack of transitional justice measures 
within other areas, especially concerning lustration. According to the theory, the criminal 
justice is part of the re-invention of the rule of law and therefore, it is assumed that the 
Czech’s re-invention is stronger than the Slovak one, as the Czech Republic had more 
prosecutions. However, looking at statistics concerning public trust in the justice system, the 
Czech population and the Slovak have the same level of trust. 25 % of the populations trust 
the justice system, whereas 72 % of the Czechs and 66 % of the Slovaks distrust the system 
(European Commission 2013c). Furthermore, in a survey asking, “how often the courts make 
mistakes that let guilty people go free”, where people could respond on a scale from 0 (never) 
to 11 (always), 53 % of the Czech respondents answered from value 6 to “always”. In Slovakia, 
it was 51 % of the respondents (European Social Survey 2010a). In a survey about procedural 
fairness in courts, the respondents answered the question “how often do you think the courts 
make fair, impartial decisions based on the evidence made available for them”. The scale 
system was the same as the above-mentioned and 22 % answered “never” up to the value 4 of 
the Czech respondents and 27 % of the Slovak respondents (European Social Survey 2010b). 
In these statistics, there is no significant difference between the population of the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, even though the Czech Republic had a much more elaborated criminal 
justice process than Slovakia. 
 
4.1.3. Lustration 
Criminal justice is not the only transitional justice measure for re-inventing the rule of law. 
Lustration laws purging the state apparatus for supporters of the former regime also promote 
the rule of law, as the State takes moral and political responsibility for the wrongdoings and 
corrects injustices of the former regime. Moreover, lustration enables the population to regain 
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trust in the new democratic institutions and legitimise the successor regime (cf. chp. 3, 
Theory: Transitional Justice).  
In the Czech Republic, political and moral responsibility for the wrongdoings represented the 
most comprehensive transitional justice measure in the Central and Eastern European region 
(Nedelsky 2009:50). The political responsibility was to ensure a democratic development by 
correcting the injustices of communism, and to react to the growing frustration that 
developed throughout the country, when the people saw communists and their supporters 
keeping their former positions (Kasthold Hansen 1990). The implementation of lustration 
laws would curtail the influence of supporters of the communist regime on the development 
of democratic institutions, and the law would satisfy the population by correcting injustice. 
Therefore, positions with influence on the democratic development, such as positions in the 
media, universities, and the state apparatus were included in the law. However, private 
companies were not included in the law, as employees were not considered to be able to 
exercise influence on the democratic development (Nedelsky 2009:62). The European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) also acknowledges the influence of employees in the state apparatus 
on the democratic development. The Court ruled in 1982 that the state has the right to purge 
the state apparatus in the transition from illiberal to liberal rule. Moreover, the Court gave an 
example of the influence of the state apparatus on the regime. “The Fall of the Weimar 
Republic was due among other things to the fact that the State took too little interest in the 
political views of its civil servants, judges, and soldiers as a result of a misunderstanding of 
liberal principles” (quoted in Horne 2014:501). Moreover, a discontinuity of the communist 
elite was important in the immediate transition because of the relationship of the StB agents 
with the Soviet State Security, KGB. It was, and still is, unknown (Ripka 2014: min, 37:22). In 
addition, some former communists held lucrative positions enabling them to grab capital and 
secure their future. The lustration law would stop this, which was one of the main reasons for 
President Havel to support a lustration law (Barfoed 1992).  
However, lustration within the theory of transitional justice is also highly criticized. Among 
others, the Council of Europe criticized the concept for urging to collective guilt (cf. chp. 3, 
Theory: Transitional Justice). In the Czech discussion about the implementation of lustration, 
this aspect played a role as the people being purged were not individually prosecuted for 
committed crimes and convicted in a court. Instead, they were simply categorised as enemies 
to the new regime with no individual judgement of their wrongdoings. Moreover, the 
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collaborators became the scapegoats for the wrongdoings. It was emotional for the Czech 
population to find out that the collaborators of the StB included ordinary people such as 
family members, friends, colleagues, and neighbours. Feelings of betrayal and humiliation 
affected the people to blame rather the collaborators for the wrongdoings than the officials 
who recruited them or the leaders that actually used the information (Gonzalez-Enriquez 
2001:223-224). However, as Matejka emphasises, the communist regime was not in power for 
more than 40 years because of collaborators, but because the people legitimised the 
communist regime in the lack of protests against it (Matejka 2014: min 29:55). President 
Havel’s political essay The Power of the Powerless (1978) likewise expresses this opinion. 
“[T]hey must live within a lie. They need not accept the lie. It is enough for them to have 
accepted their life with it and in it. For by this very fact, individuals confirm the system, fulfil 
the system, make the system, are the system” (Havel 1978:IV).  
President Havel was critical towards the lustration law, as he thought it was too radical. He 
supported the original law that would only purge those people who were prosecuted and 
found guilty by the court for the violation of human rights or other crimes. Thereby, the law 
would respect the principle of the rule of law and avoid collective guilt (Barfoed 1992). 
However, investigating the guilt of every single purged person was unrealistic and 
unpractical. Among others, the law should lustrate the 26,000 full-time employees in the StB 
and their 156,000 collaborators. In addition, the law statistically should purge every third 
worker due to membership of the Working Militia (Kuttner 1991).  
The urge of collective guilt and hence the lack of the rule of law were not the only critique of 
the law. The law relied on the archive of the StB in the lustration process, which meant that 
the work of the StB once again influenced the society. “The past state’s histories were still 
being used to punish, to exclude and to disqualify” as described by Teitel (cf. chp. 3, Theory: 
Transitional Jusitce).  
The most problematic aspect concerning the StB archive was that when the law on lustration 
was implemented in 1991, the historians and other researchers were far from having 
processed the archive. In 2007, 17 years after the revolution, only half of the 150 million 
pages the archive consists of have been expertly processed. As a consequence – among others 
– it was not revealed before 2007 that the head of Czech Interpol, Pavol Mihal, had received a 
negative lustration certificate by slightly changing the spelling of his name. As the archive was 
expertly processed, he was disclosed as a former StB agent (BBC Monitoring European 2007). 
It remains to be seen if more of these cases will appear. 
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Furthermore, the complete dependence on the StB archive is problematic in the Czech 
Republic as it is estimated that 1/3 of it was destroyed in late 1989 (Ripka 2014, min. 39:50). 
For these reasons, most of the 870 lawsuits contesting the verdict of positive lustration 
certificate between 1991 and 2005 were decided to be unjust by the courts as the evidence in 
the archive, e.g. the signature confirming the collaboration, was missing (Nedelsky 2009:49-
50). In addition, the people being purged are former supporters of lower functions, because 
the StB deregistered informers and collaborators that became members of the Communist 
Party. Therefore, collaborators and informers of lower function are purged from the state 
apparatus, whereas the ones who took the decisions and exercised political influence are not 
purged (Nedelsky 2009:62).  
The law adopted by the Czechoslovak Parliament was radical, but it made a lustration process 
possible. Despite President Havel’s criticism of the law, he approved it in the end, 
acknowledging that the lack of the rule of law was justified by limiting the effect of the law to 
five years, whereby the principle of the rule of law could be re-introduced in a stronger Czech 
democracy. Moreover, given that the law was legally valid for five years, the critique 
concerning the negative affection of reconciliation by lustration was limited (cf. chp. 3, 
Theory: Transitional Justice). 
However, the lustration law is still in force today. President Havel vetoed the prolonging of 
the law in 1995 and again in 2000 as “the Act was only relevant for the “revolutionary phase”, 
and that it was time to introduce normal rule-of-law conditions, which could permit no trace 
of collective guilt” (Kosar 2008:465). Nevertheless, the Czech Parliament prolonged it for an 
indefinite period7 in 2000 (Williams 2003:18, Nedelsky 2009:49).  
The argumentation in favour of the prolonging of the law for an indefinite period was similar 
to the argumentation presented nearly 20 years earlier. Vaclav Krasa from the Freedoms 
Union argued that “[lustration] is finding out whether an applicant for a significant position in 
the administration of the country does not have in his past a period that is incompatible with 
the principles of a democratic society and could be a signal of a future failure” (quoted in 
Williams 2003:19). Politician Jiri Payne from the Civic Democrats goes further and warns that 
former members of the StB still today present a danger for the society (Williams 2003:19). 
Accordingly, 451,000 lustration certificates had been processed from 1991 to 2005, of which 
2,03 % were “positive” lustration certificates meaning that the person had had a position 
                                                        
7 Persons born after 1 December 1971 are excluded from the lustration law today (Nedelsky 2009:49). 
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within the CSSR that now purged him/her from certain positions (Nedelsky 2009:49). In the 
years from 2006 to 2014, the Ministry of Interior processed 956 positive lustration 
certificates, of which around ¼ were issued after 2009 (Ministry of Interior 2014). Hence, 
according to the argumentation presented, nearly 1,000 persons with positive lustration 
certificates in the last 8 years constitute a security risk for the Czech democracy. This 
argumentation can be questioned, especially with reference to the low number of purged 
people and the fact that today the Czech Republic is a member of the EU and NATO and 
integrated into the global market economy (Nedelsky 2009:61). V. Ripka also comments that 
the continuing lustration law purges persons who would pose very limited threat to the 
democratic constitutional order in today’s Czech Republic (Ripka 2014: min, 32:17). Thus, one 
could argue that the fact that the lustration law is still applicable today restricts democracy by 
promoting collective guilt and undermines the rule of law. 
In contrast to the decision-makers in the Czech Republic, the Slovaks did not support the 
implementation of the Czechoslovak Federal Act on Lustration. Even though the law never 
resulted in any purging within the Slovak Republic in Czechoslovakia and the law was never 
formally implemented in Slovakia, the Parliament tried to remove it after independence by 
arguing that the law violated the constitution of Slovakia and international human rights 
agreements (Nedelsky 2004:77). However, looking at the political landscape in Slovakia after 
independence, the argument that lustration laws should be removed because of human rights 
violations is considered an excuse to legitimise the abandonment of the law. By the end of the 
Gentle Revolution8, the communists had re-organised “into” the new society. Lucrative 
positions and businesses were obtained, especially around Meciar, because these former StB 
agents, ministers and others who had had high positions within the CSSR could use their 
knowledge from the communist regime to grab capital, positions, etc., and thus ensure their 
future (Nicholson 2002a). Within the first year of democracy in Czechoslovakia, similar 
incidences happened in the Czech Republic, which was the reason for President Havel to 
support the implementation of a federal lustration law. Former Prime Minister in the Slovak 
Republic, Jozef Moravcik in Czechoslovakia, comments the Slovak situation after 
independence as “we lacked the political will” (quoted in Pisárová 2001)  
                                                        
8 The Gentle Revolution was the Slovak revolution from communism to democracy in November 1989. 
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However, the Slovak Constitutional Court processed the argument that the lustration law 
violated the Slovak constitution and international agreements presented by the Parliament, 
and ruled that the law did not violate any legal institutions (U.S. Department of State 1994).  
After the law was allowed to expire in 1996 (Nedelsky 2004:77), the people in power in 
Slovakia did nothing to implement alternatives to the lustration law. A voluntarily lustration 
process was initiated not before the Act on Nation’s Memory in 2002. However, the Act 
implemented no legal sanctioning of persons listed as agents or collaborators for the StB, but 
foresaw a “lustration without legal consequences” as Langos expressed it. With that 
expression, he meant that the UPN would render the state aware of people appearing as StB 
collaborators or highly placed agents within ministries or the like and the state would 
thereafter voluntarily demote these persons. It is not possible to know if Langos was right and 
the state purged ministries etc. for former agents or collaborators. However, the process of 
purging was furthered when the UPN started to publish lists of collaborators in 2004 (Stan & 
Nedelsky 2013b:184). As a consequence, among others, the deputy construction minister Jan 
Hurny resigned when it was published that he had been collaborating with the StB in the 
1980s. Moreover, people within the Catholic Church resigned and other MP’s were nearly 
resigning (Jurinova 2005). A survey from 2005 showed that 82 % of the Slovaks thought that 
persons appearing in the list of collaborators should resign from public life. Hence, the lack of 
an effective lustration law did not necessarily  correspond to the will of the population. 
However, the purging was not systematic and did not guarantee a discontinuity of the power 
of the elite of communism. Comparing the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the importance of a de 
facto lustration law becomes evident in the re-invention of the rule of law. Even today, the 
prosecution of crimes committed during communism is negatively affected by the lack of 
lustration in Slovakia. Moreover, former communists and StB agents are still able to exercise 
power in Slovakia through their positions within the state apparatus. In these two cases, it 
seems that lustration has an impact on the establishment of the rule of law and democracy. 
However, a de facto lustration law as in the Czech Republic would not have been able to purge 
politicians nor business leaders. Furthermore, in the Czech Republic, the readings of the all-
encompassing archive by experts is still on-going, 1/3 of the archive is destroyed, and the 
removal of collaborators who became members of the Communist Party from the archive. 
Hence, a reasonable question is, who is actually purged in the end? In relation to this, the 
prolonging of the law is not considered justified by the presented argumentation It is very 
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doubtful that these people are causing a threat to the Czech democracy today, and therefore 
the prolonging of the lustration law alludes to retributive moral punishment of former 
supporters in a way that does not correspond with democracy and the rule of law. This 
consequently intervenes with morality of the rule of law and prevents reconciliation.  
 
4.1.4. Reparation  
Reparation is defined as the financial and material compensation, property restitution, 
judicial rehabilitation, and social acknowledgement of resistance to the former regime. The 
reparation symbolises the successor regime’s recognition of the victims of the past 
wrongdoings. The importance of reparation increases in cases where punishment is not 
possible (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Transitional Justice). 
In the transition of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the process of official recognition of the 
wrongdoings was initiated in 1990 with the Act on Judicial Rehabilitation in April 1990. The 
law invalidated judicial decisions that contravened with political and civic rights guaranteed 
in the constitution as well as international agreements and accords. It eliminated the 
disproportional hardship that was a result from repression. It provided social rehabilitation 
and material compensation. One year later, an additional Act on Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation 
was approved entitling more people to financial and adequate compensation (David 
2012:769). Moreover, several acts were passed to return property stolen by the communist 
regime back to the owners.  
In the Czech Republic, the government had the power to issue directives to compensate the 
former political prisoners after the Act on the illegality of the communist regime was adopted 
in 1993. The political prisoners were compensated on several occasions with the latest 
directive in 2011 on compensating political prisoners. In case they are dead, the 
compensation can be received from the widow or widower or children (David 2012:769-771, 
Act 262/2011). 
David & Yuk-ping (2005) completed a study of the perception of the reparation programme in 
the Czech Republic among political prisoners. Their findings showed that the immediate 
financial compensation to political prisoners in 1990, and thereafter the gradual development 
of the programme, was important to the political prisoners. Firstly, the financial 
compensation was helpful for the everyday running. Many former political prisoners had 
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health issues due to the imprisonment, and the compensation supported the use of medicine. 
Secondly, the political prisoners felt that the financial compensation symbolised the society’s 
acknowledgement of the wrongdoings in the past (David & Yuk-pin 2005:421-424). The 
president of the Czech Political Prisoner’s Association in 2001, Stanislav Drobny, commented 
similarly on the policy of financial compensation as “compensation is not only about the 
money, but also about the acknowledgement and justice” (own translation, quoted in Schmidt 
2001).  
Besides financial compensation, reparation promotes peace and reconciliation in the forward-
looking approach (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Transitional Justice). In the Czech reparation 
programme, reconciliation initiatives were among others advanced by the re-employment of 
political prisoners in the positions they had before they were imprisoned. During 
communism, most political prisoners were not allowed to get the old position back after 
imprisonment. Instead, they were downgraded to low skilled jobs. Therefore, the ability to get 
the original job back – if possible – had a reconciling effect for the political prisoners (David & 
Yuk-pin 2005:425-426).   
In general, the Czech rehabilitation gave the political prisoners a feeling that the State 
acknowledged the past wrongdoings. However, the lack of criminal justice affected the 
political prisoners’ rehabilitation. Especially when it was revealed how much money former 
StB officers received in pension as compensation of their forced retirement in comparison to 
compensation for political prisoners (David & Yuk-pin 2005:399,430-434). 
In Slovakia, the Act on the illegality of the communist regime likewise had an influence on the 
reparation of victims of communism, but several additional acts also furthered the 
compensation of political prisoners. The Minister of Justice from 1998 to 2002, Jan 
Carnogursky, focused on compensation to the victims and provision of some level of justice. In 
general, he was active in promoting a transitional justice and in 1999 he set up a Department 
for the Documentation of Crimes committed by the Communist Regime under the Ministry of 
Justice (Nedelsky 2004:78-79). The Department provided information to people who sought 
rehabilitation, mainly for loss of job or property during communism. In addition, in 2002 the 
Parliament passed an Act for further compensation not only for living political prisoners but 
also widows and widowers and children of now dead political prisoners. The President of the 
Slovak Political Prisoner’s Association and MP in 2002, Ladislav Pittner, commented 
"although suffering can't be translated into money, this is a gesture towards those who were 
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unjustly punished, and it's a kind of moral satisfaction for the victims of communism" (quoted 
in Pisárová 2002). In this way, the Slovak state, as well as the Czech, recognised the victims of 
the communist wrongdoings.  
However, even though the importance of reparation increases in cases where punishment is 
not possible (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Transitional Justice), the lack of criminal justice and lustration 
in Slovakia has minimised the perception among political prisoners that the state 
acknowledges the wrongdoings. With respect to the high positions held by former 
communists in Slovakia 2002, Pittner commented  "Communist persecution was a painful 
experience for us, and the worst is that the people who caused us this pain today have 
enormous wealth and are still laughing in our faces" (quoted in Nicholson 2002a). 
Many evaluate the reparation programme in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia as 
successful (David & Yuk-pin 2005:430-435, Ripka 2014: min, 39:11, Jasek 2014: min, 12:00). 
Many acts have been implemented to ensure the restitution of stolen property and financial 
compensation of political prisoners, which in some degree have brought political 
acknowledgement of the wrongdoings. However, the feelings of insufficient criminal justice in 
both cases and, in addition, the lack of a lustration law in Slovakia limit some of the effects of 
reparation.   
 
4.1.5. Opening of Archives 
An open archive policy gives the transitioning societies an opportunity to open up for the 
truth of the communists’ wrongdoings in order to confront future challenges in the process of 
democratisation. Even though the opening of the archives would not delegitimise the 
communist regime equally as in trials, the open archives would be the second best solution. 
Furthermore, open archive policy gives citizens access to the state and enables a truth telling, 
which is important for the democratisation process (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Transitional Justice).  
In the Czech Republic, the first initiative towards opening the archive was in 1996 when the 
Parliament passed a law allowing the partly opening of the archives. People could ask to see 
their file, but with names of third parties blacked out. Thereafter, complementary laws have 
gradually opened the archive more and more. Today, it is possible to ask for the files of 
collaborators, agents and dissidents. The central argument from politicians supporting the 
policy of gradually opening the archive was that the open archive gave the citizens access to 
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the state and the truth about the wrongdoings (Nedelsky 2009:51-52). When the Parliament 
extended the law in 2002 allowing people to read the files of collaborators, the initiator of the 
law, Senator Dagmar Lastovecka, stated that the law would allow “the Czechs to know their 
history” (quoted in Nedelsky 2009:52). President Havel expressed a similar opinion by 
acknowledging that “the importance of the truth is higher that it suppresses all the rest” and 
that “his signature was one step toward the purification of the nation” (quoted in Nedelsky 
2009:52). The complete opening of the archive in 2002 was criticized by, among others, 
dissidents who once again had their privacy violated by the state, as people could read every 
detail of the collected compromising evidence against these people, including documentation 
of their love lives (Nedelsky 2009:52-53).  
Nevertheless, the open archive allows studying the motivations for collaboration, which 
according to Just is crucial to avoid repetition of the history in the future:  
“We should also say, he was member of the communist party or he cooperated, 
what made him do it. I think this is important for the studying of the history. 
Because then you can maybe prevent similar things in the future. When you 
actually study why people decided to collaborate, what pushed them to do so 
and how they did it. I think the learning from the history and not only for, as I 
said, justice, but also for historical reasons” (Just 2014, min: 14:40). 
Similar argumentation is often behind initiating truth commissions, where the first of its kind, 
the Argentinian Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas published the report by 
the name Nunca Más (Never Again). The main task of the Commission was to find the truth 
about the persons that disappeared in the “dirty war” in the 1970s and to use the evidence in 
criminal prosecutions. Moreover, as the name suggests, the work of the Commission should 
also prevent similar tragedy to reappear (Bosoer 2014).  
Since 2007, the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes (USTR) has managed the 
archive. Among others, the mission of the USTR is to publish books and videos, organising 
events and exhibitions about the repression during communism, to influence the memory of 
the CSSR and to facilitate reflection about the past. This reflection is important to understand 
the repression during communism and thereby to ensure the development of a sustainable 
democracy and a free society (Matejka 2014, min 2:37). Hence, the open archive policy and 
the USTR substitute the function of a truth commission by controlling public investigations. 
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Furthermore, it gives citizens access to the state and ensures democratic development 
through a truth telling mechanism (cf. chp. Theory: Transitional Justice).   
However, an open archive policy to give the society an opportunity to open up for the truth of 
the communists’ wrongdoings and give the citizens access to the state to promote 
democratisation is reduced if the population is not interested or avoids the truth telling in 
favour of nostalgia. According to Matejka, these issues constitute a problem in the Czech 
Republic. A greater part of the Czech population is forgetting the repression of the communist 
regime and nostalgia about the regime is becoming stronger. In this way, more and more 
citizens are emphasising how times were better under communist rule, as no one was 
unemployed, people had an apartment, and free healthcare was provided (Matejka 2014, min. 
13:54, Just 2014, min. 0:21). Just says, “the people do not understand today that these 
measures were bribing the population not to stand up against the regime” (Just 2014, min. 
0:51). In addition, Matejka explains that one of the main challenges for the USTR is simply to 
get peoples’ interest in the communist past (Matejka 2014: min. 13:26). Similar tendencies are 
evident in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). After the country was annexed to 
West Germany, it implemented a transitional justice process on the same level or even more 
comprehensive than the Czech process (Letki 2002:537). Nevertheless, in 2009 a survey 
showed that 57% of eastern Germans defended the GDR and 49% agreed on the statement 
“The GDR had more good sides than bad sides. There were some problems, but life was good 
there”. Half of the young people in eastern Germany would not describe the GDR as a 
dictatorship and would characterise the Stasi as a normal intelligence service (Bonstein 
2009). The tendencies of nostalgia and disinterest not only question the effect of open archive 
policy, but also question the argument that open archives would be the second best solution 
to delegitimise the communist regime (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Transitional Justice). 
Furthermore, truth telling implies reflection on the reasons for the loss of democracy and 
freedom. This way of confronting the past lets the society move on in a democratic 
development (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Transitional Justice). However, according to Matejka, a public 
narrative emphasising that outsiders caused the undemocratic and repressing periods of the 
Czech history influences this confrontation. By this narrative, the Czech population is without 
any responsibility for the wrongdoings during communism, because it was Nazi-Germany that 
destroyed the democracy of the First Republic in 1938, the communists destroyed the partly 
democratic Czechoslovak Federal Republic in 1948, and the Soviet Union enforced the 
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normalisation in mid-August 1968. This is likewise the case in the Act on Illegality of the 
Communist Regime and Resistance Against It, where the word ‘resistance’ describes the 
people who stood up against the regime. However, in Czech language the word also includes 
passive resistance, and not only active revolt (David 2012:768). The externalisation of the 
perpetrators from the victimised Czech nation is also apparent at the only permanent 
exhibition about the communist past in the National Museum in Prague. Here the 
Czechoslovak and Czech history is presented from the narrative described above by Matejka 
(Matejka 2014, min 29:06).   
Looking at elections in the Czech Republic, the open archive policy seems also to have 
troubles delegitimising communism. In 2002, the Communist Party reached 18,5 % of the 
votes. Since then it has decreased and in 2013, it received 15 % making the party the third 
strongest party in the Chamber of Deputies (Czech Statistical Office 2014). Special for the 
Communist Party in the Czech Republic is that the party had a very limited reform after the 
fall of communism, and among others, they oppose the membership of NATO, they believe in 
the implementation of Marxist democracy, and they have been criticized for not condemning 
the repression during the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (KSCM 2006).  
Hence, the nostalgia and disinterest about the communist regime might undermine the open 
archive policy as a mechanism to give citizens access to truth telling about the wrongdoings in 
the communist past to delegitimise the communist regime.  
In Slovakia the archive was partly opened with the Act on Nation’s Memory in 2002. Langos, 
the initiator behind the law, commented to the approval of the law “the truth will set us free” 
(Holt 2002). The partly opening of the archive allows Slovak citizens to read their own file or 
the file of a deceased relative, though personal data of other persons mentioned in the file is 
blacked out (Act 553/2002: article 1, § 23). Hence, the law gives the Slovaks access to the 
state and provide a truth telling however, with limitations as the law does not give access to 
the name(s) of possible informer(s) appearing in the file, nor does the law give access to files 
of collaborators to find motivations behind collaborating. This affects negatively the 
opportunity to open up for the truth of the communists’ wrongdoings and to delegitimise the 
communist regime. 
In Slovakia, the population does not have the same access to their history as in the Czech 
Republic. Nevertheless, as Slovakia is also struggling with disinterest in the communist past 
(Jasek 2014, min. 12:50), an open archive policy as in the Czech Republic would maybe not 
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have significant change. On the other hand, the country has neither a lustration law nor an 
elaborated criminal justice process, hence an open archive policy could “be the second best 
solution to delegitimise the communist regime” (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Transitional Justice).  
However, in the Czech Republic, the open archive policy has not been able to delegitimise the 
communist regime, which the support to the Communist Party and growing nostalgia in the 
society illustrates.  
 
4.1.6. The Evaluation 
The Czech Republic implemented one of the most comprehensive political transitional justice 
processes in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. It consisted of: 
 1990: Act on Rehabilitation. The Act compensated political prisoners and cleared their 
names. It opened for prosecution in some cases where the statute of limitation would 
normally apply. 
 1991: Act on Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation. The Act furthered compensation of political 
prisoners. 
 1991: Act on Lustration. The Act purged the state apparatus and other workplaces with 
influence on the democratic development of higher-ranking communists, members of 
the Workers Milits, and StB agents and collaborators. 
 1993: Act on Illegality of the Communist Regime and Resistance Against It. The Act 
opened up for prosecutions of crimes committed during communism where statutes of 
limitation would normally apply. It established the Coordination Centre for the 
Documentation and Investigation of Violence Against the Czech Nation in 1995. 
 1996: Act on Disclosure of Files Established by Activities of the Former State Security 
Force. The Act partly opened the archive for Czechs to read their own file, with the 
names of third parties blacked out. 
 2002: Amending Act No. 140/1996 on the Disclosure of Files Created in the Course of 
Activities on the Past of the Former State Security Service. The Act implemented an open 
archive policy, which allowed people to read the files of collaborators, dissidents, etc. 
 2007: Act on the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes and the Security Services 
Archive. Established the USTR. 
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The transitional justice is characterised by the Parliament using the legislative power to 
condemn the wrongdoings of the communist regime, and moral condemnation of the 
communist regime from a partly independent body was not initiated before the USTR in 2007 
(Priban 2007:320). Matejka criticizes the role of the Parliament in the transitional justice, 
because it limits reflection on the communist past within the population. He compares the 
situation with another trauma in Czech modern history; the expulsion of the ethnic Germans 
from the Sudetenland9 after World War II, and how this also used to be characterised as a 
political issue (Matejka 2014: min. 08:38, 10:29). In 1995 – 50 years later – the Czech 
historical narrative was still biased and 52 % of the Czech population deemed the expulsion to 
be just. However, within the last 10 – 15 years, the historical narrative of what had happened 
after World War II in the Czech Republic changed, and in 2011, 42 % perceived the expulsion 
of the Germans as just. According to O. Matejka, what made this change in the understanding 
of the Czech history was that the politicians withdrew from the debate and instead gave room 
for historians, the civil society, etc. These groups then started a process of reflection within 
the society about what actually happened after World War II, which caused the population to 
be more critical about the expulsion of the Germans (Matejka 2014: min. 10:07). 
These broad reflections in the society about the history of Germans in Czech Republic stand in 
contrast to the reflection about communism (Matejka 2014: min. 12:17). According to 
Matejka, the interventions from the political sphere in dealing with the communist past by 
passing laws, establishing police units, the USTR, etc. take away the responsibility from the 
people to reflect on the communist past. Hence, the people do not feel they should reflect on it, 
because institutions are established for that purpose. This leaves out all ordinary people in 
these crucial reflections (Matejka 2014: min. 14:34). According to Sharp (2013), traditional 
transitional justice risks separation between what is implemented politically and the effect on 
the society. He argues further that transitional justice should be expanded to “involve a 
greater embrace of participatory and community-level approaches to justice rooted in local 
norms and traditions” (Sharp 2013: Quote 152, 160-161).  
In Slovakia, the following transitional justice measures were passed in Parliament:  
                                                        
9 In the northern, southwest and western part of the Czech Republic, also known as the Sudetenland, a minority 
of ethnic Germans were living since 12 century (Kind-Kovacs 2014:205). They were expelled by very violent 
manners after World War II and between 10,000 and 100,000 suffered a violent death as a consequence of the 
expulsion by the Czech authorities (K.S. 2013).  
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 1990: Act on Rehabilitation. The Act compensated political prisoners and cleared their 
names. It opened for prosecution in some cases where the statute of limitation would 
normally apply. 
 1991: Act on Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation. The Act furthered compensation of political 
prisoners. 
 1991: Act on Lustration. The Act was only formally recognised, but in reality, it did not 
purge the state apparatus and other workplaces for higher-ranking communists, 
members of the Workers Milits, and StB agents and collaborators who could influence 
the democratic development negatively. 
 1996: The Immorality and Illegality of the Communist Regime. The Act opened up for 
prosecutions of crimes committed during communism by exempts from statutes of 
limitation.   
 2002: Act on Nation’s Memory. The Act partly opened the archive for Slovaks to read 
their own file. It established the Institute on Nation’s Memory (UPN). 
Characteristic for the Slovak transitional justice process is a general political disinterest in the 
measures implemented, which the two dissidents Jan Carnogursky and Jan Langos have 
mainly initiated. An explanation to the political disinterest is that already in the first post-
communist election in 1990, the communists were reorganised and had found a home in new 
parties. For example on the candidate list of Public Against Violence nine out of ten candidates 
had a past in the Communist Party. The party had led the Gentle Revolution and many Slovaks 
saw the party as a platform for mainly dissidents (Nicholson 2002a). Nevertheless, it was not 
only the Public Against Violence that consisted of former communists, but every party, except 
the Catholic Democratic Movement (KDH) who actually tried to exclude communists from the 
party (Mihalikova 2014: min, 05:58).  
In the debate concerning the law on Nation’s Memory, the President and former member of 
the Communist Party, Rudolf Schuster said: "Many of the things that are being opened up now, 
slowly, 13 years after the revolution, I would judge as counterproductive." The legislation 
would only help the KSS [Slovak Communist Party], he said. "To open old wounds after so 
many years will bring joy to the communists, who can use it to increase their support" (Holt 
2002).  
Even though the law reached a big enough majority in the Parliament to overrule Schuster’s 
veto, the UPN has afterwards met great challenges by political disinterest and hostility. It was 
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particular difficult for the UPN after Langos was tragically killed in a car accident on 15 June 
2006, and the UPN was left without a director for nearly 6 months. The Chair of Board of 
Directors is elected by the Parliament (UPN 2014b). As Slovakia shortly after Langos’ accident 
held parliamentary elections giving the Social Democrats (SMER-SD), HZDS, and the Slovak 
National Party (SNS) the power, it was not completely surprising that months passed by 
without any successful election of a new Chair. Members of HZDS had for a long time been 
hostile towards Langos and the UPN, but the other government parties were not big 
supporters of the institution either. In the end, the Parliament elected the controversial Ivan 
Petransky as Chair. He was a right wing candidate of the SNS and before his candidacy for the 
party, he had worked at the nationalist cultural organisation Matica Slovenska, which among 
others, celebrates the wartime Slovak puppet regime of Nazi-Germany and its leaders (Stan & 
Nedelsky 2013b:184).  
The SMER-SD who is the successor party of the Communist Party neither showed great 
interest in the work of the UPN. For instance, in January 2007, it was suddenly announced that 
the UPN was to be removed from the buildings that had been renovated with the purpose of 
housing it. The excuse for the removal was that Bratislava needed courtrooms. In the end the 
UPN was never removed however, Prime Minister Robert Fico10 (SMER-SD) used the occasion 
to disapprove the work of the UPN and state that he had never believed a word of Langos 
(Stan & Nedelsky 2013b:184-185). Other challenges occurred to the UPN and in 2008, the SNS 
even demanded the closing of the UPN. The party afterwards withdrew the demand, leaving 
some party members disappointed (Stan & Nedelsky 2013b:185).  
 
 
4.2. Sub-conclusion 
In the Czech Republic, the use of legislative power to condemn the wrongdoings of the 
communist regime instead of a moral condemnation from an independent body might limit 
the effect of the transitional justice measures implemented to confront the past. Nevertheless, 
the political will has resulted in one of the highest amounts of prosecutions for crimes 
committed during Communism. The implementation of the lustration law has enforced purges 
of the state-apparatus for supports of the former regime, which most properly supported the 
                                                        
10 Robert Fico is also the current Prime Minister of Slovakia 
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democratisation in the first post-communist years. The open archive policy gives the Czech 
population access to their history, and facilitates truth telling about the past wrongdoings. As 
it is possible to read about the motivations for collaboration, the policy moreover has an 
educational contribution and prevents repetitions of the past. Furthermore, the rehabilitation 
has been successful in the acknowledgment of past wrongdoings by compensating political 
victims and handing over lost property and thus, letting the society move on in that respect.  
However, there are dilemmas within the transitional justice measures implemented in the 
Czech Republic. The lustration law had positive effects; however, it is not paying regard to 
collaborators who became members of the Communist Party or the fact that a complete 
review of the archive is not achieved yet. Furthermore, the continuity of the lustration law 
alludes to retribution and thus even has an undemocratic character. In addition, the lustration 
law promotes the Czech narrative of repression coming from outside, not the Czechs 
themselves. This makes a clear black/white distinction between former supporters of the 
regime and non-supporters and poses a threat to reconciliation. There is no sufficient 
difference between the Czech and Slovak trust in the justice system, even though the Czech 
Republic investigated, prosecuted, and convicted many more people. This questions the re-
invention of the rule of law by criminal justice. The open archive policy promotes truth telling 
and prevents repetition of the past, however; the society has a growing nostalgia and 
disinterest in the communist past and the non-reformed Communist Party is the third 
strongest in the Chamber of Deputies. The transitional justice is characterised as one of the 
most comprehensive in the region, but it works on the political level and is disconnected from 
the population, which leaves the population without responsibility to reflect themselves about 
the past wrongdoings.  
The transitional justice process in Slovakia is characterised as the work of a few individuals. 
The integration of communists in the new parties after the Gentle Revolution has led to a 
political disinterest in implementing transitional justice measures. Especially the lack of an 
effective lustration law limits the work of UPN even today, as they are not able to prompt 
prosecution, due to political obstacles at the General Prosecutors Office. However, the 
transitional justice process is not only limited due to the turbulent years of Meciar in the 
1990s. Looking at the Prime Minister Fico’s rhetoric about the work of Langos and the UPN, 
one could argue that no true regime shift has actually happened.  
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Nevertheless, these acknowledgements do not explain sufficiently why the countries are 
democracies today. The analysis below analyses the influence of the EU in the transitions to 
democracies and in comparison with the transitional justice measures evaluate the 
importance of transitional justice in the democratisation process of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. 
 
 
4.3. Part 2: Europeanisation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
The theory of transitional justice delivers some answers to the democratisation, especially in 
the Czech Republic. The lustration law effectively contributed to the disruption of the 
continuity of the former communist elite, which in comparison to Slovakia led to a difference 
with respect to the re-invention of the rule of law. In contrast, the transitional justice process 
in Slovakia has been vague and the implemented measures are not considered to have had a 
remarkable influence on the democratisation. Nevertheless, I do not think that the transitional 
justice processes deliver sufficient answers to the democratisation in both countries, 
particularly because the theory of transitional justice does not elaborate the role of 
international actors in the democratisation. Therefore, the role of the EU in the 
democratisation is analysed in the following section. 
According to Manners (2002, 2009, 2011), the EU diffuses norms and ideas to its 
neighbourhood and associated countries by the means of enlargement policies, 
representations, exchange of goods, aid or trade, and even unintentionally (cf. chp. Theory: 
Europeanisation). Hence, in the following analysis, I analyse EU’s influence on the democratic 
development in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and the measures used by the EU to achieve 
this.  
 
4.3.1. The Europe Agreement 
Several agreements have been elaborated and signed by the EU and the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia since the regime shift in 1989. The first agreement was the Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement between the EU and Czechoslovakia in 1990. The Interim Agreement and the 
Europe Agreements followed, respectively in 1992 and 1995 (Press Release 1996).  
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In addition to the agreements that had already been established concerning trade and trade-
related matters, the Europe Agreements further expanded the association. Thus, a political 
dimension was added, which committed the associated countries to recognise the 
establishment of “a new political order which respects the rule of law and human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, and operates a multi-party system 
with free and democratic elections” (Europe Agreement SK 1994:3, Europe Agreement CZ 
1994:3). Moreover, cultural, financial, and technical assistance became part of the overall 
contractual framework of the Europe Agreements (Press Release 1996).  
At the European Council meeting in Essen in 1994, the member states agreed that the 
associated Central and Eastern European countries could become members of the EU, if they 
fulfilled the requirements (Council 1994). Therefore, as both Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
applied to EU membership (Opinion SK 1997:5, Joint Press Release CZ 1996), the Europe 
Agreement were also elaborated to prepare the countries to access the Union and pre-
accessing programmes became sub-agreements to the Europe Agreement (Europe Agreement 
SK 1994:2).   
The PHARE Programme11 was the largest of these sub-agreements to the Europe Agreements 
and focused on assistance in the implementation of the acquis communautaire - the general 
legislation and regulations of the EU (Briefing 33 1998). The implementation of the acquis 
communautaire in each candidate country constituted a necessary condition to EU 
membership. More specifically, the PHARE Programme assisted the democratic institution 
building in the implementation of the necessary administrative structures, which are required 
for the adoption of EU regulations. Furthermore, by assisting the adoption of EU legal norms 
and standards, the PHARE Programme supported needed investments (OECD 2004 85-86).  
Slovakia 
As mentioned above, the Europe Agreement included political aspects, in contrary to former 
agreements that were only concentrated on trade and trade-related matters. With the Europe 
Agreements, the associated countries now agreed to ensure the “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
                                                        
11 Originally, the PHARE programme was meant to assist the development in Poland and Hungary, therefore the 
name “Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies” (PHARE), however the programme 
was afterwards expanded to also include the Czech Republic and Slovakia (OECD 2004:85) 
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minorities” (Opinion SK 1997:13). In the case that the set conditions were not respected, the 
cooperation would stop, as it was the case with Slovakia in 1997.  
As mentioned in the description of the cases (cf. chp. 2, Methodology: Case Study), the political 
transition towards democracy stopped under Meciar’s rule and, compared to the democratic 
developments initiated in Czechoslovakia, Slovakia was moving backwards. Meciar’s rhetoric 
towards the press was similar to the one used by the leaders of the CSSR, and even US 
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, warned that Slovakia could become a “black hole” in 
Central Europe  (Shepherd 2000:149,165). This development did not correspond to the 
Europe Agreement and the accession negotiations between the EU and Slovakia. In the end of 
1995, the European Parliament  
“points out to the Government of the Slovak Republic that, if it continues to follow 
policies which show insufficient respect for democracy, human and minority 
rights and the rule of law, it will be necessary for the European Union to 
reconsider its programmes of assistance and cooperation under the Europe 
Agreement which might have to be suspended” (European Parliament 1995). 
This resolution among others (European Parliament 1998) did not change Meciar’s ruling of 
the country, with the consequence that the Commission, in its Opinion on the application on 
Slovak membership to the EU in 1997, concludes that 
“In the light of these considerations [the political situation], the Commission 
concludes that Slovakia does not fulfil in a satisfying manner the political 
conditions set out by the European Council in Copenhagen, because of the 
instability of Slovakia’s institutions, their lack of rootedness in political life and 
the shortcomings in the functioning of its democracy” (Opinion SK 1997:130). 
The Commission continues that it regrets the fact that the government of Slovakia is not 
implementing the democratic measures required by the Europe Agreement, as the country 
would fulfil the economic criteria to be included in the next round of accession negotiations 
(Opinion SK 1997:130). Hence, Slovakia was excluded from a bilateral intergovernmental 
conference, as the only country of the Visegrad countries, because of the lack of democratic 
development (Toby 1997). 
The parliamentary elections in 1998 became the crucial moment with regard to the 
development of democracy in Slovakia. Since the turbulent years of the political transition in 
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the start of the 1990s, the opposition had managed to unite against Meciar and his coalition. 
Moreover, EU’s clear communication to Slovakia underlined the fact that democratic deficits 
were the reasons why Slovakia was excluded from the accession negotiations in 1998. At the 
same time, it was also clearly communicated that the country would be included again, once 
these issues had improved (Opinion SK 1997:130, Regular Report SK 1999:70). Due to this 
clear rhetoric used by the EU, the opposition was able to present an alternative to the policy of 
Meciar and his coalition. Concretely, the presented alternative was a future Slovak integration 
into the Western institutional frameworks, via accession negotiations and the prospect of EU 
membership. In fact, the exclusion from the accession negotiations was severely perceived by 
the Slovak people, in particular because the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to 
further negotiation rounds. The comparison to and the competition with the Czech Republic 
was, particularly after the independence, an important factor of Slovakia’s self-perception, 
given that it was generally seen as the lesser developed, the more uneducated and the poorer 
part of the Federation, in other words as the little brother of the two. Slovakia’s competition 
with Hungary is mainly based on historical reasons and goes back to goes back to when 
Slovakia was part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, and the Hungarians suppressed the 
Slovak nationality and language. In addition, a Hungarian minority of 500,000 people in 
Slovakia tensed the relationship during the rule of Meciar. Hence, the generally pro-european 
population of Slovakia did not want to be left aside and wished to join the Union just as its 
neighbours (Mihalikova 2014: min, 11:55), Geer 2004:720). Therefore, the fact that the EU did 
not close the door for further negotiations in 1998 and gave prospects of membership 
conditioned to improvements in the democratisation, was crucial for the opposition to win the 
election.  
However, it was not easy for the opposition to win the elections. Meciar had before managed 
to deal with challenges such as the removal from office in 1992 and gotten re-elected by the 
people afterwards. In addition, he was the most liked politician in Slovakia in the 1990s 
(Fitzmaurice 1999:291, Anderson & Done 1998). Therefore, it is doubtful that the opposition 
would have been able to win without the engagement of NGO’s and their OK’98 campaigning 
for free and fair elections. The goal of OK’98 was to improve the voter awareness and 
encourage people to vote. Thus, the campaign focused on information about each party and 
the potential consequences of the election of each coalition. In this way, the OK’98 was able to 
present an alternative to the policy of Meciar, namely the prospected membership of EU and 
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NATO if the required democratic changes were implemented. The impressively high voter 
turnout of 85%, which is still today the highest turnout in Slovakia’s history, reflects the 
importance of the work of the NGO’s (IDEA 2014). Moreover, the EU friendly opposition won 
(Potocki 1998).  
Thus, the parliamentary elections in 1998 changed the political situation in Slovakia. Meciar 
and his coalition lost power and the new government managed to get the country back on the 
democratic track. Several things in the elections were different compared to the election in 
1994. However, different from the election in 1994 was the role of the EU. Firstly, Slovakia’s 
exclusion from accession negotiations and EU’s clear communication to Slovakia with respect 
to the conditions for the re-opening of the negotiations promoted a procedural diffusion of 
norms. After its decision in Essen in 1994, stating that the Central European post-communist 
countries could become members if they implemented the acquis, the EU institutionalised the 
relationship with Slovakia. The prospects of EU membership linked to the condition of an 
improvement in democratisation were crucial for the EU friendly opposition to win. This is by 
Manners (2011) characterised as the procedural diffusion (cf. chp. 3, Theory: The European 
Union). Furthermore, the NGOs and their OK’98 campaign had a crucial influence on the result 
of the election. The PHARE Programme supported the OK’98 campaign both financially and by 
civic education, raising activities for young voters, monitoring activities, and “helped to 
ensure free and fair elections” (Regular Report SK 1999:8). Hence, the transfer of aid/financial 
contribution through the PHARE Programme gave the EU a way to influence the democratic 
development of the country. This transference diffusion of norms working bottom up was an 
addition to the institutionalised relationship that was working top down (cf. chp. 3, Theory: 
Europeanisation). The success of the OK’98 campaign also influenced the perception and 
increased the general recognition of the third sector in Slovakia, which further promoted the 
democratisation (Political Criteria 1999:2).  
Besides the institutionalised relationship between the EU and Slovakia and the support to the 
OK’98 campaign by the PHARE Programme, the accession negotiations also advanced 
transnational party linkages between Slovak parties and EP groups. The transnational 
linkages were initiated after the fall of communism and became an important factor for the 
development of Slovak parties.  
The KDH was the most dominant party concerning the transnational cooperation and 
received an associate membership to the European People’s Party, linked to the EP group, in 
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1996. Party linkages with European parties were also established by the Democratic Union 
(now Slovak Democratic and Christian Party – Democratic Party, SDKU-DS). This party, 
together with the Democratic Party (now SDKU-DS) and the KDH, formed the Slovak 
Democratic Coalition (SDK) that won the parliamentary election (Pridham 1999: 1229-1230). 
Other non-governmental parties also created transnational party linkages and it became 
common to have party linkages with European parties and EP groups before the 1998 
election. Some parties used these transnational linkages in the start of the 1990s to identify 
the party and the party programme. However, as time passed, the “programmatic influence 
became less formative but rather conformed to a pattern whereby member parties of 
transnational organisations adapted their broad policy lines to agreed European positions” 
(Pridham 1999:1232). Moreover, the growing relationship with European parties and EP 
groups increased the Slovak opposition parties’ informal access to the European Parliament in 
Brussels and Strasbourg, in times where Meciar was isolating Slovakia from the EU 
institutions (Pridham 1999:1234). Hence, the transnational party cooperation influenced the 
development of the pro-EU Slovak opposition and provided the parties with material and 
moral support in the 1998 elections against Meciar and his coalition. This influence from 
European parties and EP groups was unintended, in the sense that there were no 
requirements to align policies to agreed European positions. Furthermore, this contagion 
diffusion of norms (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Europeanisation) enabled the EU to lobby for accession 
negotiation through other channels than the formal ones established with the government 
(Grittersová 2012:12). 
The parliamentary elections in 1998 became the symbol of when the Slovaks chose to be a 
democracy influenced by EU’s diffusion of norms by persuasion, argumentation, and the 
conferral of prestige or shame (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Europeanisation). Nevertheless, the 
democratic situation in Slovakia was still fragile, and as expressed by political scientist Kusy 
in 1998, “We have to distinguish between Mečiar and Mečiarism… The latter is characterised 
by a primitive style of politics, by populism and disregard for legal structures, and it will last 
in Slovakia long after Mečiar's departure” (quoted in the Slovak Spectator 1999). To support 
the democratic development, the EU set up several initiatives and financial support, training, 
technical development, and twinning12 from 1998 to the final accession in 2004. In total, the 
                                                        
12 Twinning is a training programme where experts from the administration of member states are sent as 
mentors to candidate countries to support the building of institutions (Report from the Commission 2003: 
Summary). 
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PHARE Programme granted €572,4 million to the economic and political transition of 
Slovakia from 1992 to 2002 (Regular Report SK 2002:13).  
 
The Czech Republic 
In contrary to Slovakia, the Czech Republic was a much more consolidated democracy in the 
1990s. In 1997, the Commission evaluated the country to “[…] present the characteristics of a 
democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights, and respect 
for and protection of minorities” (Opinion CZ 1997:16). Moreover, the House of Freedom 
already in 1993 categorised the Czech Republic “free” with 1 for political rights and 2 for civil 
liberties (Swimelar 2008:510). Croatia received the same rating in 2014 (Freedom House 
2014:19). With respect to the role played by international actors, Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier (2004) conclude that “[…] in the democratic frontrunners, such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, EU governance was unnecessary for democratization and 
democratic consolidation” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004:669). Nevertheless, I do not 
consider the Europe Agreement and accession negotiations and finally the EU membership as 
unimportant in the democratisation.  
Besides the assistance within the framework of the PHARE Programme in the establishment 
of the institutions and administration in accordance with EU legislation, the Czech Republic 
also received funding and assistance to the development of a free market economy and the 
social consequences the transition would have (Berlingske Tidende 1991). This was 
particularly important in 1997, when a financial crisis hit the country. The Czech economic 
miracle and the Western perception that Prime Minister Klaus’ was able to “turn a rusty old 
communist economy into gold with a breath-taking speed and efficiency” (Shepherd 2000:65) 
were being questioned. The Czech Crown suffered a crisis in summer 1997 whereupon 
several attacks by speculators affected the currency to be historical lows against the Dollar 
and Deutschmark. The unemployment rate of 3 % in the start of 1998 rose to 7,5  % in 
January 1999, and the public debt increased (Fawn 2000:100,103-104, Shepherd 2000:74). 
The PHARE Programme and the European Investment Bank (EIB) therefore contributed to 
strengthening crucial sectors of the economy. The PHARE Programme contributed with 
almost €11 million in 1999 and 2000, e.g. to the promotion of SME13, bankruptcy legislation 
                                                        
13 SME is an abbreviation of small and medium-sized enterprises 
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and credit risk management (Regular Report CZ 1999:7, Regular Report CZ 2000:10). In 
addition, the EIB provided €30 million for industrial projects whereas the total amount of 
funds lend to the Czech Republic to promote SME and infrastructural projects reached €1,8 
billion (EIB 1998). Even though the aid was not directed to democratic development, 
substantial financial support from the EU is built on the transference diffusion of norms and 
the concepts of “more for more” and “less for less” (cf. chp. 3, Theory: Europeanisation). In 
other words, if the Czech Republic had not continued the development of democracy, it would 
have had consequences for the accession agreements under which an important part of the 
support from the PHARE Programme was negotiated. The financial support to a consolidated 
market economy is also considered important in the continuing development of democracy, 
as “Those countries which are unable to attain economic consolidation, being also politically 
weak and dependent, can reach at most the state of semi-democracies with the constant 
danger of sliding back to authoritarian rule” (Agh 1991:140).  
Moreover, the PHARE Programme also gave policy advice and arranged twinning to establish 
the administration and institution according to the pertinent EU legislation (CZ 9808:1). In 
total, the Czech Republic received €2 million to “Strengthening the Democratic System, the 
Rule of Law, Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities” out of €22,45 million in 1998 
(PHARE Programme 1998:30). In 1999, the Czech Republic received  €0,5 million out of a 
total of €16 million (PHARE 1999:30), in 2000 €4,5 million out of €59 (Regular Report CZ 
2000:10), and in 2001 €3 million out of €65,5 million (Regular Report CZ 2001:10). The 
diffusion of norms has been the most notable with respect to the part “protecting minorities” 
and more specifically, the rights for the Roma population in the Czech Republic. The 
Commission commented in 1997 that “they [the Roma] are the target of numerous forms of 
discrimination in their daily lives and suffer particular violence from skinheads, without 
adequate protection from the authorities or the police” (Opinion CZ 1997:15). A report from 
Human Rights Watch in 1995 reported 27 murders on Roma and 181 acts of violence within 
the period 1989-1995. Furthermore, many Roma became stateless due to the velvet divorce 
and  were denied citizenship afterwards (Long 2005:152). 
The Czech government did little to improve the situation of the Roma in the start and mid-
1990s. Some would even argue that the government did not acknowledge that there was a 
problem, despite the fact that the Council of Europe and the U.S. State Department reported 
that the biggest human rights problem in the Czech Republic was discrimination against Roma 
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(Swimelar 2008:511). However, the lack of initiative to improve the situation changed when 
the European Commission published its Opinion on Czech membership to the EU. It concluded 
that the Czech Republic fulfilled the democratic requirements, but emphasised that the 
country needs to improve the inclusion of Roma into the society (Opinion CZ 1997:15). In the 
following years until the membership in 2004, the Commission released public evaluations of 
the implementation of the acquis emphasising the need to improve the situation for the Roma 
population. These public reports and the requirement of the implementation of the acquis 
prior to membership changed the Czech government’s perception of the situation for the 
Roma. It gradually implemented policies, committees, and commissions focusing on human 
rights improvements within the area of Roma. In 2001, the Czech initiatives since 1997 were 
evaluated, stating “considerable effects have been made by the Czech government as regards 
Roma and other minorities” (Regulation Report CZ 2002:19).  
The improvements of the situation of the Roma minority were based on a combination of 
national engagement and international funding, among others the PHARE Programme. The 
support for NGO’ initiatives within education, employment, etc. amounted to €5,4 million 
between 1998-2001. That constitutes more than half of the total funding within the category 
of “Strengthening the Democratic System, the Rule of Law, Human Rights and the Protection 
of Minorities” allocated to the Czech Republic in those years (PHARE 2003:7-8). Furthermore, 
the EU Structural Funds have several projects beneficial for the Roma after the Czech Republic 
has become a member of the EU (Sirovatka 2011:2). Hence, similar to Slovakia, procedural 
diffusion of norms took place through the institutionalised relationship between the Czech 
Republic and the EU, whereby the Czech Republic committed to improve the minority rights. 
The transference diffusion occurred via the aid provided in the PHARE programme, which 
also contributed to an overt diffusion through the twinning programme. Lastly, the diffusion 
of norms also changed the population’s perception of Roma. In surveys from the mid-1990s, 
92 % of the respondents stated that they dislike Roma (Swimelar 2008:510), in 2008 this 
number had dropped to 60 % (Ali 2013). The fact that more than half of the Czech population 
disliked Roma in 2008 is still a very high proportion of the population and shows that 
eliminating discrimination and promoting integration is a long process. Nevertheless, the 
situation did change in comparison to the early 1990s. The policy of the Czech government 
from 1997 concerning the inclusion of Roma and the respect of human rights improved the 
situation. Moreover, the decreasing number of Czechs that dislike Roma could be affected by a 
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diffusion of norms as a cultural filter. This diffusion changes the impact of international 
norms, which leads to a process of “learning, adaption or rejection of norms” (cf. chp. 3, 
Theory: Europeanisation). In other words, an increasing impact of human rights within the 
Czech society lead to processes of learning, adaption and changing opinion about Roma for 
nearly 1/3 of the Czechs. 
 
 
4.4. The Historical Narratives 
The agreements and programmes initiated by the EU to support and influence the democratic 
development in Central and Eastern Europe were important for the democratisation of 
Slovakia. The procedural diffusion of norms by institutionalising the relationship in 
combination with transference diffusion through the PHARE Programme and contagion 
diffusion by party linkages to European parties and EP groups had a crucial influence on the 
1998 election.  
In the Czech Republic, the democratic consolidation was much stronger in the early 1990s and 
the diffusion of norms by the EU is not seen as crucial for the democratic development as it 
was the case in Slovakia. Nevertheless, the financial support of the economic transition has on 
impact on democratisation, which should not be underestimated. Furthermore, the EU’s 
diffusion of norms improved the human rights in the country, in particularly concerning the 
situation of the Roma minority.  
With regard to the theory of transitional justice, the aspect of Europeanisation and normative 
power Europe offers a useful insight in order to assess the importance of transitional justice 
for transitional democracies. Concerning the comparison of the democratisation of the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, their past in Czechoslovakia and CSSR was argued to be a common 
denominator. However, with respect to the perceptions and experiences of the two countries 
in Czechoslovakia and the CSSR, their narratives diverge, which influences their democratic 
transition.  
Generally, there is a strong linkage to Czechoslovakia in the Czech Republic before World War 
II. The country was a democratic republic and one of the most industrialised countries in the 
world with an international competitive market economy (Petrovic 2013:64). The country 
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had good connections to the West and was part of the West. However, this changed with the 
Munich Agreement in 1938 that sold Czechoslovakia to Nazi-Germany. The perceived betrayal 
consequently turned the Czechs away from the West into the hands of the communists in the 
East (Shepherd 2000:13-14,22-23). When communism disintegrated, the Czech Republic 
could finally ”Return to Europe”, as the main political slogan stated in 1990 (Opinion CZ 
1997:5).  In addition, it was and still is a common perception that the communists had robed 
the Czech population for wealth and caused their poverty compared with countries in 
Western Europe (Matejka 2014, min. 25:40). 
In contrary to the Czech narrative, communism in Slovakia actually made the country richer 
and contributed tremendously to the industrialisation of the country. Before 1948, Slovakia 
had as many as 60 % of the workforce employed in the agricultural sector. Until 1989, the 
percentage decreased to 12 % (Bezak & Mitchley 2014:1343-1344). The new industry was 
mainly based on heavy industry among others, the production of arms for other members of 
the Warsaw Pact and employed around 80,000 people in 1988 (Nicholson 2002b). The boost 
in the industrialisation in Slovakia might also have contributed to the support of the 
Communist Party. Accordingly, 1,500,000 Slovaks – out of a population of 5,000,000 people – 
were members of the Communist Party (Mihalikova 2014: min, 06:22).  
The violent repression of the Czechoslovak Spring in 1968 by the members of the Warsaw 
Pact is a trauma for both populations in the now independent republics. However, some of the 
only reforms of 1968 that were not abolished when Husak was put in power after the failed 
reforms of “socialism with a human face” were the agreements granting more autonomy to 
the Slovak Republic in the CSSR. Hence, the Czechoslovak Spring actually furthered the Slovak 
wish of autonomy and was not only a symbol of violent repression. The policy of 
normalisation after the Czechoslovak Spring hit the Czech Republic statistically harder than 
Slovakia, as 87 % of the total state repression was effected on Czech dissidents in 1986 
(Nedelsky 2004:83-84). In Slovakia, there were not many dissidents and most of them were 
religious, except an environmental movement that was initiated shortly before the Gentle 
Revolution (Mihalikova 2014: min, 07:52). Moreover, only eight signers of the Charter 7714 in 
1976 were Slovaks, whereas 231 signers were Czech (Nedelsky 2004:83).  
                                                        
14 Charter 77 was founded by dissidents after CSSR sign the Helsinki Act in 1975 to invoke respect for human 
rights. 
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Hence, the differences in the historical narratives about the past also promoted different 
approaches in the transition to democracy.  
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5. Concluding Reflections 
 
5.1. Conclusion 
Is transitional justice important for democratisation? 
The analysis above clarifies how the Czech Republic, in stark contrast to Slovakia, 
implemented on of the most comprehensive transitional justice processes in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The Czech Republic had one of the highest numbers of prosecutions for 
crimes committed during communism. In contrary, Slovakia only prosecuted one person and 
further prosecutions are, among other reasons, limited by the lack of lustration laws. 
Nevertheless, there is no sufficient difference in the Czech and the Slovak trust in the justice 
system, which alludes to the fact that the initiated criminal justice in the Czech Republic was 
not sufficient to re-invent the rule of law.  
The de facto implementation of lustration law in the Czech Republic enforced purges of the 
state-apparatus for supporters of the former regime. In comparison to Slovakia, the lustration 
law supported the re-invention of the rule of law because supporters of the former regime in 
the Czech Republic are not in positions where they can have a negative influence on the 
democracy. In Slovakia, the lack of a lustration law allows the continuity of the communist 
regime in the legal system, which challenges the criminal justice. However, the fact that the 
lustration law is still in force in the Czech Republic today alludes to retribution and is even 
considered undemocratic. 
The open archive policy of the Czech Republic allows the population to access its history and 
the wrongdoings of the past. It promotes a confrontation of the past, has an educational 
approach and prevents a repetition of the past. In Slovakia, the archive is partly opened, which 
does not promote truth telling to the same extent, but gives the Slovaks access to see their 
own file. Nevertheless, the delegitimising effect of the former regime, which an open archive 
policy should promote, is questionable in the Czech Republic, where the Communist Party is 
the third strongest party in the Chamber of Deputies. Furthermore, in both countries, a 
disinterest in the communist past challenges the open archive policy. The reparation 
programmes in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have been gradually elaborated and 
have been successful in the acknowledgement of the past wrongdoings.  
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Lastly, the transitional justice process of the Czech Republic is criticised for being political and 
disconnected of the population. This criticism is in contrary to the critique of the Slovak 
transitional justice process, which is characterised by the political sphere’s disinterest in 
confronting the past. The contrast seems to be explicable in the historical narratives of the 
communist past in each country.  
In the Czech Republic, anti-communism in the immediate transition promoted a regular 
regime shift, which was the biggest promoter of democracy and cleared the way for the 
implementation of transitional justice measures and democratic adjustments from the EU. In 
Slovakia, communism, in the perception of the population, had not only brought bad things 
but also industrialised the country. As a consequence, the anti-communism was not influential 
enough to prevent the reorganisation of members of the Communist Party in new parties and 
their continuity into the new democracy. Even with a de facto lustration law in Slovakia, it had 
not changed the political landscape, as the lustration law did not purge elected politicians or 
people in positions in private companies. However, the diffusion of norms by the EU 
influenced the democratic development of Slovakia by persuasion, argumentation, and the 
conferral of prestige or shame. Hence, the Europeanisation of Slovakia was crucial for the 
development of democracy with the continuity of the communist political elite.  
Thus, the democratisation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia shows that the discontinuity of 
the political elite was crucial for the implementation of transitional justice measures in the 
Czech Republic. In the light of the continuity of the political elite in Slovakia, the diffusion of 
norms from the EU was pivotal for the democratic development. Hence, there is good reason 
to believe that the importance of transitional justice in the development of democracy is 
dependent on a discontinuity of the political elite from the former regime.    
 
 
5.2. Further Research 
This project analyses the importance of transitional justice in the democratisation of the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia and concludes that transitional justice assists democratisations 
in situations where a regular regime shift has happened. However, in cases where such a 
discontinuity of the political elite did not take place, transitional justice does little difference 
and Europeanisation is crucial for democratisation. Nevertheless, the analysis of 
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Europeanisation is focused on policies from the 1990s and early 2000. In contrary to the time 
before the fifth enlargement15 in 2004 and the sixth enlargement16 in 2007, the nationalistic 
parties within the EU Member States have become an important determining factor of the EU 
development. These parties demand a limit and decrease of the influence of the EU in the 
individual Member State, and question the foundation of the EU as the free movement of 
goods, services and people (DF 2009, Euro News 2014). An eighth enlargement towards the 
West Balkans, Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean South therefore seems many years into 
the future. Given the fact that the EU does not offer the prospect of membership to these 
countries, the diffusion of norms through institutionalising the relationship with associated 
countries is the more and more difficult. 
Therefore, a further analysis of the normative power Europe and the diffusion of norms to the 
neighbourhood would add important perspectives about democratisation in Europe as well as 
in its neighbouring countries today.  
Furthermore, the project focuses on the democratisation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 
the transitional years of the 1990s. However, this excludes the long-term aspect of 
transitional justice. Even though only 25 years have passed and additional 25 years would 
improve the long-term aspects of transitional justice measures, it would still be possible to 
conduct a more thorough analysis of the democracy in the Czech Republic and Slovakia today, 
in order to elaborate implemented transitional justice measures in consolidated democracies.   
  
                                                        
15 The fifth enlargement was the accession of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta (European Commission 2013b). 
16 The sixth enlargement was the accession of Bulgaria and Rumania 
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Annex 1: Presentation of the interviewees 
In the section underneath the professional background of the interviewees is presented and 
their contribution to this project.  
Peter Jasek – Historian at Nation’s Memory Institute (UPN) 
Jasek is Ph.D. in history and works in the Section of Scientific Research. The work in the 
Section focuses on systematic research of periods of oppression in Slovakia and international 
cooperation. The professional background of Jasek is research in the Gentle Revolution and 
the immediate transition to democracy. There is limited research of the Slovak transitional 
justice process, and the interview therefore gave useful knowledge about the immediate 
transition of Slovakia and the transitional justice process of the country. In addition, Jasek’s 
work at the UPN gave me an insight in how the UPN works and what they think is challenging 
in their work. Furthermore, Jasek’s attendance at international conferences and cooperation 
with other memory institutes in the region gave me a good overview of the Slovak transitional 
justice in comparison to transitional justice processes of other post-communist countries. 
Lastly, Jasek gave me material produced by the UPN about the communist regime in Slovakia 
and Czechoslovakia, which has broaden my understanding of the context of the Slovak 
transitional justice and democratisation.   
Petr Just – Head of Department of Political Science and Humanities, Metropolitan 
University  
Just is Ph.D. in politology at Metropolitan University in Prague. The main focus in his work is 
constitutional, governmental, and party systems of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Czechoslovakia. This contributed to knowledge about the Czech transition to democracy with 
comparative elements to the Slovak. Just discussed the apparent contrasts of the transitional 
justice processes of the two countries, which in the end evaluated as good (the Czech) and bad 
(the Slovak). Moreover, Just gave a good overview of the current democratic situation in the 
Czech Republic today. The knowledge of Just contributed to a broader and critical view on the 
transitional justice process in the Czech Republic.  
 
Ondrej Matejka – First Deputy Director of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian 
Regimes (USTR) 
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Matejka works as the First Deputy Director at the USTR and has the main responsibility for 
the Section for Research on Totalitarian Regimes and the Publishing Sector. The interview 
with Matejka gave pivotal knowledge about the work and function of the USTR and the 
challenges the Institute meet in the Czech society today. Furthermore, Matejka had a great 
insight into the transitional justice measures implemented in the Czech Republic. The 
knowledge about the challenges for the UTSR and hence problems for the transitional justice 
measures, would be difficult to find in other sources, because it is a mix of experiences from 
the work at the UTSR and in-debt knowledge about the Czech society.  
Silvia Mihalikova – Dean of the Faculty of Social and Economic Science, Comenius 
University 
Mihalikova is professor in political science at the Institute of European Studies and 
International Relations and Dean of the Faculty of Social and Economic Science at Comenius 
University in Bratislava. The professional background of Mihalikova is research on the 
democratic transition of Slovakia, before the velvet divorce in 1993 and after the era of Meciar 
and in EU enlargement policies in Central Europe. The interview contributed with useful 
information about how Slovakia developed democracy and the influence of communism that 
is still effective on the Slovak society today. The interview with Mihalikova contributed with 
knowledge about the Slovak democratisation that would have been difficult to find from other 
sources and gave an overview of the way from communism to democracy.  
Vojtech Ripka – Head of Education at the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes 
(USTR) 
Ripka is Ph.D. in political science. He works at the Section for Research on Totalitarian 
Regimes and is head of education. His work focuses on the everyday life during the policy of 
normalisation and the breakdown of communism in Central Europe. The interview with Ripka 
gave an additional insight into the work of the USTR and due to his professional background 
in political science; he contributed with useful information about the relation between the 
transitional justice measures implemented and the development of the Czech democracy. 
Moreover, he had a great overview of the research on the Czech transitional justice process 
and referred several very useful articles to me.  
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Annex 2: Interview-guide Jasek, P.  
Theme Purpose: Interview question: 
 
Introduction 
 
To find out the interviewee’s 
background related to the 
democratisation of Slovakia 
 
Could you give a brief 
introduction of yourself? 
 
What is your role here at the 
Nation’s Memory Institute? 
 
 
The transitional justice of 
Slovakia 
 
To find out how Slovakia has 
dealt with the past and if it is 
sufficient 
 
What is the role of the 
Institute in Slovakia and the 
society? 
 
Do you see the Institute as 
part of the transitional justice 
of Slovakia? Why/why not? 
 
How is Slovakia dealing with 
its past today? 
- What do you think 
about the measures? 
- Are they sufficient?  
 
In 2005 a list of collaborators 
was published, why?  
- Has there been other 
initiatives of truth 
telling? E.g. building a 
museum? 
 
 
The lack of transitional 
justice in Slovakia 
 
To find out why Slovakia did 
not start the process of 
transitional justice before 
2002. 
 
Looking at the transitional 
justice initiated by 
Czechoslovakia, Slovakia did 
not follow up after 
independence, why not? 
- Czech Republic did, 
what do you think is 
different? 
- In Czech Republic the 
historical narrative of 
communism is that it 
made them poorer. The 
opposite was the case 
in Slovakia, do you 
think that has 
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something to do with 
the different processes 
of transitional justice 
afterwards? 
 
Some scholars argue that 
Slovakia did not have a 
transitional justice, because 
the country in the 1990’s had 
to focus on stabilising the 
country, what do you think 
about that argument? Is it 
valid? 
 
Others again argue that 
politics in Slovakia have 
hindered a process of 
transitional justice, what do 
you think about that 
argument? Is it valid? 
 
 
The future prospects of 
Slovakia 
 
To find out if the argument 
from transitional justice 
theory concerning the lack of 
transitional justice will in the 
long run make a society 
unstable is valid.  
 
With the transitional justice 
process Slovakia had until 
now, do you think the society 
need for justice will increase 
doing the years? 
 
The argument within the field 
of transitional justice is that if 
you do not confront the past’s 
wrongdoings, the society will 
in the long run be unstable, 
could that happen to 
Slovakia? 
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Interview-guide Just, P. 
Theme Purpose: Interview question: 
 
Introduction 
 
To find out the interviewee’s 
background related to the 
democratisation of Slovakia 
 
Could you give a brief 
introduction of yourself? 
 
 
 
The transitional justice of 
Czech Republic 
 
To find out how Czech 
Republic has dealt with the 
past and if it is sufficient 
 
How is Czech Republic dealing 
with its past today? 
- What do you think 
about the measures, 
e.g. the lustration 
laws? 
- Are they sufficient?  
 
In 2003 a list of collaborators 
was published, why?  
 
Why did Czech Republic have 
a much more 
radical/comprehensive 
transitional justice than the 
neighbour countries? 
 
What do you think is missing 
in the Czech transitional 
justice? 
 
 
The Slovak and Czech 
transitional justice 
 
To clarify the different 
circumstances influencing 
the transitional justice 
process of the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia 
 
Looking at the transitional 
justice initiated by 
Czechoslovakia, Czech 
Republic followed up, Slovakia 
did not, how come?   
- What is different for 
the two countries? 
 
Some scholars argues that the 
historical narrative of 
communism in the Czech 
Republic is that communism 
made them poorer and that 
this narrative influences a 
transitional justice approach 
in the Czech Republic, is that a 
valid argument?  
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Other scholars argue that 
politics in Slovakia have 
hindered a process of 
transitional justice, how has 
politics influenced the 
transitional process in Czech 
Republic? 
 
 
Factors influencing the 
democratisation  
 
To clarify the relationship 
between transitional justice 
and democracy 
 
Do you think the transitional 
justice in the Czech Republic is 
a crucial factor in the 
democratisation? 
- The Czech Republic 
had a better economy 
after the divorce than 
Slovakia, did the 
economy influence?  
 
 
The future prospects of Czech 
Republic 
 
To find out if the argument 
from transitional justice 
theory concerning having 
transitional justice will 
contribute to democracy.  
 
How is the democratic 
situation in Czech Republic 
today? 
 
What do you see as the 
biggest democratic issue in 
the Czech Republic today? 
 
 
Interview-guide Matejka, O. 
Theme Purpose: Interview question: 
 
Introduction 
 
To find out the interviewee’s 
background related to the 
democratisation of the Czech 
Republic 
 
Could you give a brief 
introduction of yourself? 
 
What is your role here at the 
Institute? 
 
 
The transitional justice of the 
Czech Republic 
 
To find out how the Czech 
Republic has dealt with the 
past 
 
What is the role of the 
Institute in the Czech Republic 
and the society? 
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How is the Czech Republic 
dealing with its past today? 
- What do you think 
about the measures? 
- Are they sufficient?  
 
In 2003 a list of collaborators 
was published, why?  
- Has there been other 
initiatives of truth 
telling? E.g. building a 
museum? 
 
 
The Slovak and Czech 
transitional justice 
 
To clarify the different 
circumstances influencing 
the transitional justice 
process of the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia 
 
Looking at the transitional 
justice initiated by 
Czechoslovakia, Czech 
Republic followed up, why did 
the Czech Republic follow up?   
- Why the different 
approach? 
 
Some scholars argues that the 
historical narrative of 
communism in the Czech 
Republic is that communism 
made them poorer and that 
this narrative influences a 
transitional justice approach 
in the Czech Republic, is that a 
valid argument?  
 
Other scholars argue that 
politics in Slovakia have 
hindered a process of 
transitional justice, how has 
politics influenced the 
transitional process in Czech 
Republic? 
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The democratisation of the 
Czech Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
To clarify the relationship 
between transitional justice 
and democratisation   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you think the transitional 
justice process in the Czech 
Republic is a crucial factor for 
the democratisation? 
 
What do you think the 
transitional justice process is 
missing in the Czech Republic? 
 
 
Interview-guide Mihalikova, S. 
Theme Purpose: Interview question: 
 
Introduction 
 
To find out the interviewee’s 
background related to the 
democratisation of Slovakia 
 
Could you give a brief 
introduction of yourself? 
 
 
 
The transitional justice of 
Slovakia 
 
To find out how Slovakia has 
dealt with the past and if it is 
sufficient 
 
How is Slovakia dealing with 
its past today? 
- What do you think 
about the measures? 
- Are they sufficient?  
 
In 2005 a list of collaborators 
was published, why?  
- Has there been other 
initiatives of truth 
telling? E.g. building a 
museum? 
 
 
The lack of transitional 
justice in Slovakia 
 
To find out why Slovakia did 
not start the process of 
transitional justice before 
2002. 
 
Looking at the transitional 
justice initiated by 
Czechoslovakia, Slovakia did 
not follow up after 
independence, why not? 
- Czech Republic did, 
what do you think is 
different? 
- In Czech Republic the 
historical narrative of 
communism is that it 
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made them poorer. The 
opposite was the case 
in Slovakia, do you 
think that has 
something to do with 
the different processes 
of transitional justice 
afterwards? 
 
Some scholars argue that 
politics in Slovakia have 
hindered a process of 
transitional justice, what do 
you think about that 
argument? Is it valid? 
 
Other scholars argue that 
Slovakia did not have a 
transitional justice, because 
the country in the 1990’s had 
to focus on stabilising the 
country, what do you think 
about that argument? Is it 
valid? 
 
 
State-building to democratise 
 
To find out which factors that 
promoted democracy 
 
With a limited process of 
transitional justice, why do 
you think Slovakia is a 
democracy today?  
 
What factors took the country 
in the right direction after the 
rule of Meciar? 
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The future prospects of 
Slovakia 
 
To find out if the argument 
from transitional justice 
theory concerning the lack of 
transitional justice will in the 
long run make a society 
unstable is valid.  
 
How is the democratic 
situation in Slovakia today? 
- How is corruption 
influencing the 
democracy today? 
- Is the corruption less 
or more since 1998? 
 
The argument within the field 
of transitional justice is that if 
you do not confront the past’s 
wrongdoings, the society will 
in the long run be unstable, 
could that happen to 
Slovakia? 
 
 
Annex 6: Interview-guide Ripka, V. 
Theme Purpose: Interview question: 
 
Introduction 
 
To find out the interviewee’s 
background related to the 
democratisation of Slovakia 
 
Could you give a brief 
introduction of yourself? 
 
What is your role here at the 
Institute? 
 
 
The transitional justice of the 
Czech Republic 
 
To find out how the Czech 
Republic has dealt with the 
past and if it is sufficient 
 
What is the role of the 
Institute in the Czech Republic 
and the society? 
 
How is the Czech Republic 
dealing with its past today? 
- What do you think 
about the measures? 
- Are they sufficient?  
 
In 2003 a list of collaborators 
was published, why?  
- Has there been other 
initiatives of truth 
telling? E.g. building a 
museum? 
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The Slovak and Czech 
transitional justice 
 
To clarify the different 
circumstances influencing 
the transitional justice 
process of the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia 
 
Looking at the transitional 
justice initiated by 
Czechoslovakia, Slovakia did 
not follow up after 
independence, why not? 
- Czech Republic did, 
what do you think is 
different? 
- In Czech Republic the 
historical narrative of 
communism is that it 
made them poorer. The 
opposite was the case 
in Slovakia, do you 
think that has 
something to do with 
the different processes 
of transitional justice 
afterwards? 
 
Some scholars argue that 
Slovakia did not have a 
transitional justice, because 
the country in the 1990’s had 
to focus on stabilising the 
country, what do you think 
about that argument? Is it 
valid? 
 
Others again argue that 
politics in Slovakia have 
hindered a process of 
transitional justice, what do 
you think about that 
argument? Is it valid? 
 
 
The future prospects of the 
Czech Republic 
 
To find out if the argument 
from transitional justice 
theory concerning the lack of 
transitional justice will in the 
long run make a society 
unstable is valid.  
 
With the transitional justice 
process the Czech Republic 
had until now, do you think 
the society need for justice 
will increase doing the years? 
 
 
